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Executive summary 
 This report models several potential transitional arrangements that may ease the 
distribution pressures arising from reforms to negative gearing and capital gains 
tax (CGT) reform, and help smooth a reform pathway that is more politically 
acceptable.  
 Negative gearing and CGT discount benefits are currently heavily skewed 
towards those who are more affluent, raising concerns around the extent to 
which such policies exacerbate income and wealth inequality among the 
Australian population.  
 We model a progressive rental deduction reform whereby ‘mum and dad’ 
investors receive greater access to generous tax concessions than ‘sophisticated’ 
investors on higher income and wealth levels.  
 The progressive rental deduction reform cushions ‘mum and dad’ investors from 
significant drops in tax savings and will moderate adverse impacts on their 
economic wellbeing in comparison to a blunt cap on rental deductions.  
 A progressive rental deduction reform has the potential to reduce inequities in 
the current negative gearing system by reducing tax savings by proportionately 
greater amounts for those with higher income or property asset levels.  
 However, progressive rental deduction reforms are likely be administratively 
more complex to implement than a rental deduction cap. The former may also 
blunt incentives to work by investors. 
 A reduction in CGT discount will also have the potential to reduce inequities 
within the current system that favour higher income earners compared to lower 
income earners.  
 A gradual reduction in the CGT discount would ‘soften’ the impact of the CGT 
reform by providing a transition pathway that raises the after-tax economic cost 
of holding rental investment housing incrementally.  
Key findings  
How do existing elements of the Federal income tax system (in particular the availability 
of deductions and CGT provisions) potentially impact on housing ownership and 
affordability? 
Currently, the Australian tax system offers preferential income tax treatment to both owner-
occupied and own-to-invest properties. Owner-occupied properties are exempt from many 
taxes, including CGT. There is no imputed rent applied to claw back the exemption. In respect 
of own-to-invest properties, the report’s policy audit has shown that the income tax treatment of 
investment property provides an annual tax deduction to the owners of negatively geared 
property that subsidises the holding cost of property. This deduction is made up of a 
combination of cash outgoings, of which the most significant is loan interest, and capital 
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allowances that are non-cash expenses. In contrast, when the property is sold the gain is 
included on the capital account. The amount is included on realisation and is subject to a CGT 
discount of 50 per cent when derived by an individual or a trustee, or 33 per cent when derived 
by a superannuation fund. 
Hence, the policy audit identified two key sources of asymmetric (or unbalanced) treatment of 
rental income and capital gains in the investment property market. First, there is a mismatch in 
the timing of the deduction and the capital gain, with the deductions predating the capital gain. 
Second, the amount of the rental deduction is not discounted, whereas the capital gain is 
discounted. This combination of factors provides an incentive for the owners of investment 
properties to borrow a larger proportion of the acquisition price. The incentive arises because 
the interest deduction is allowed in full whereas only 50 per cent of the capital gain is included. 
A leveraged investment will result in a higher capital gain where the growth in property prices 
exceeds the interest rate. 
Which investor groups, household types and housing market segments benefit or are 
disadvantaged by current negative gearing and CGT provisions?  
Negatively geared investors who receive the highest tax savings are typically middle-aged full-
time employed males. On the other hand, the ones who benefit the least are females and older 
investors aged 55+ years who are not in the labour force. Home-owner investors who own both 
a family home and at least one rental investment property received the greatest CGT discount 
benefits, while renters who do not own properties do not receive any CGT discount. CGT 
discount benefits are heavily weighted towards those who are more affluent in terms of both 
income and property wealth. On average, a home-owner investor can own a property portfolio 
worth over $730,000. Home-owner investors’ average tax assessable income is $82,000 
compared to $31,000 among renters who do not own any properties.  
What are the revenue and distributional impacts of different negative gearing reform 
scenarios and transitional arrangements on housing investors and the Federal budget?  
A complete abolition of negative gearing reforms has often been criticised by policy-makers for 
its potentially adverse impacts on the financial wellbeing of ‘mum and dad’ investors. Hence, in 
our first set of policy simulations, we distinguish between ‘mum and dad’ investors and 
‘sophisticated’ investors who own higher levels or income or wealth, and we apply more 
generous concessions to the former. We differentiate between these investor groups in two 
ways—by applying income and property-based criteria.  
Under the proposed reforms, ‘mum and dad’ investors in the bottom half of the income and 
property value distributions continue to receive a 100 per cent rental deduction and therefore 
experience no reduction in tax savings. At the other extreme, those in the upper quartile are 
subject to a full quarantine of negative gearing and therefore receive zero rental deductions, 
resulting in a complete loss of their tax savings from negative gearing. Those in the 50th to 75th 
percentiles receive an intermediate 50 per cent rental deduction. ‘Mum and dad’ investors in this 
group lose around half of their rental deductions and are therefore cushioned from a complete 
loss of their rental deductions. Hence, ‘mum and dad’ investors are less likely to make a 
behavioural decision to exit the rental market than if they were subject to a full quarantining of 
negative gearing, holding other factors constant. Such a measure therefore represents a 
potential transitional arrangement that could ease the pathway towards a complete negative 
gearing quarantine for all rental investors over time.  
If a rental deduction cap is applied across all income levels, the average tax savings that 
negative-geared rental investors receive reduce only very slightly by $25 under a generous 
$40,000 cap to a $921 decline if the cap is further reduced to $5,000. Reducing the cap levels 
will result in increasingly lower levels of rental deductions across the income distribution.  
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Overall, the two reforms that will result in the greatest amount of budgetary savings are a rental 
deduction cap of $5,000 and progressive rental deductions on an income-based criteria—both 
cost $1.3 billion each, resulting in savings of over $1.7 billion each. Both are progressive in 
nature, reducing tax savings from negative gearing by greater margins as tax assessable 
income increases.  
What are the revenue and distributional impacts of different CGT reform scenarios and 
transitional arrangements on housing investors and the Federal budget?  
It is possible to estimate the impact of a reduction in CGT discount rate on rental investors’ 
economic outcomes in two ways. The first approach is to estimate the impact of the CGT reform 
on rental investors’ after-tax or net incomes at the point of sale. The second is to estimate the 
impact of the reform on a rental investor’s after-tax economic costs of holding rental property 
(per dollar of the capital value of their rental property) by amortising the investor’s CGT liability 
across the investor’s property holding period. 
A reduction in CGT discount rate reduces the net incomes of rental investors. However, the 
extent of this reduction will depend on interactions across various factors, including the discount 
rate reduction, the investor’s income and the investor’s capital gains on the rental property at 
the time of sale. The greater the reduction in CGT discount rate and the higher the capital gains 
upon sale, the greater the reduction in net income. Holding other factors constant, a higher 
income investor will also experience a greater dollar reduction in net income at each reformed 
CGT discount rate than a lower income investor. However, in proportionate terms, the high-
income investor experiences a smaller percentage reduction in net income.  
A reduction in the CGT discount rate will impact on the after-tax economic costs of rental 
investors on higher incomes to a greater degree than investors on lower incomes. So for 
instance, among those in the 0.1–15 per cent MITR band in 2010, a reduction in CGT discount 
rate from 50 per cent to 0 per cent would raise their average user cost of capital from 
7.3 per cent to 8.1 per cent, a rise of 0.8 percentage points. However, among investors in the 
highest MITR tax bracket, average user cost of capital would rise by 1.2 per cent—from 
7.4 per cent to 8.6 per cent.  
A gradual reduction in the discount would ‘soften’ the impact of the CGT reform. It provides a 
transition pathway that raises the after-tax economic costs of holding rental investment housing 
by 0.1 percentage point for every 10 percentage point reduction in the CGT discount rate. 
Assuming a rental investment property value of $350,000, a 0.1 percentage point increase in 
user cost amounts to $350 per year.  
Policy development options  
Negative gearing and CGT discount benefits are currently heavily skewed towards those who 
are more affluent, potentially exacerbating income and wealth inequality among the Australian 
population. In 2013–14, negatively-geared rental investors made a loss of around $8,800 on 
average while positively geared investors made a profit of around $16,000. However, 
negatively-geared investors have noticeably higher tax assessable incomes than positively-
geared investors. The former reported an average tax assessable income of $91,000 in 2013–
14 compared to $78,500 among positively-geared investors. Among negatively-geared 
investors, those who receive the greatest tax savings also have the highest incomes and rental 
property values, and greatest net rental losses.  
Similarly, CGT discount benefits are heavily weighted towards those who are more affluent in 
terms of both income and property wealth. On average, a home-owner investor owned a 
property portfolio worth over $730,000 in 2013–14. Home-owner investors’ average tax 
assessable income was $82,000 compared to $31,000 among renters who did not own any 
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properties. Hence, any reforms to negative gearing or CGT ought to ensure that it reduces 
inequities inherent within the current systems by reducing tax savings by proportionately greater 
amounts for those who have relatively high income or asset levels. 
Negative gearing reform scenarios 
A key policy concern is that a tightening of negative gearing parameters will impact ‘mum and 
dad’ investors’ economic wellbeing negatively and result in their mass withdrawal from the 
rental housing market. Hence, a progressive rental deduction that cushions ‘mum and dad’ 
investors from significant drops in tax savings will likely be a more appropriate policy option than 
a more blunt $5,000 cap on rental deductions. The potential for significant housing supply 
contraction in the rental market may in turn be lower under a progressive rental deduction, 
holding other factors constant.  
Moreover, an income (property value)-based deduction has the potential to reduce inequities 
inherent within the current systems. It does so by reducing tax savings by proportionately 
greater amounts for those who have relatively high income (property asset) levels than rental 
deduction caps. 
However, progressive rental deduction reforms might be administratively more complex to 
implement than a cap. A more practical approach may be to differentiate between ‘mum and 
dad’ investors and ‘sophisticated’ investors by income or property value bands rather than 
percentile ranges. 
Regardless of the income measure used to differentiate between the two types of investors, the 
nature of progressive rental deduction reforms may blunt incentives to work by investors looking 
to reduce their incomes so they fall into a band or percentile that allows them to be classified as 
‘mum and dad’ investors. 
Capital gains tax discount scenarios 
A reduction in CGT discount rate would reduce the net incomes of rental investors. Holding 
other factors constant, a higher income investor will also experience a greater dollar reduction in 
net income at each reformed CGT discount rate than a lower income investor with the same 
capital gains rate. However, in proportionate terms, the high-income investor experiences a 
smaller percentage reduction in net income. Clearly, there is a discrepancy between percentage 
and dollar value impacts. Any CGT policy reform proposals would need to be carefully 
communicated to avoid a misconception that the impact of the CGT reform is likely to be 
regressive in terms of its proportionate impact on income.  
A reduction in CGT discount will narrow the gap in user cost burdens that lower income and 
higher income rental investors have to bear, reducing inequities within the current system. This 
finding supports a case for a transitional approach in CGT reform. However, it is worth noting 
the pros and cons of adopting an approach of amortising CGT liabilities. While it represents a 
convenient and logical approach in the absence of necessary data on sales transactions and 
capital gains, it does not reflect the reality that the CGT is actually a lump sum liability rather 
than a recurrent expenditure. 
The study  
This study develops and models pathways to reform the income tax treatment of housing 
assets. It focuses on key tax arrangements that have featured prominently in national policy 
debates as having the potential to exacerbate distortions in property markets, including negative 
gearing arrangements and CGT provisions. The study is part of a wide AHURI Inquiry entitled 
Pathways to Housing Tax Reform. 
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The existing literature has highlighted concerns around the potentially distortionary effects of the 
present Federal income tax treatment of housing assets on housing market stability and 
housing affordability. Personal income tax concessions distort investment decisions, with 
adverse implications for the distribution of housing assets and outcomes in the housing market. 
First, the presence of debt-financed housing investors on a large scale is a potential source of 
instability in the housing market. Second, it would appear that property investors are 
increasingly crowding out first home buyers from the property market. Third, the asymmetric tax 
treatment of rental income and capital gains favour high tax bracket investors at the expense of 
low tax bracket investors. Fourth, the main residence exemption, under which a primary 
residence is exempt from capital gains tax, can reduce mobility of labour supply. In short, 
personal income tax concessions distort investment decisions, with adverse implications for the 
distribution of housing assets and outcomes in the housing market. Despite periodic national 
reviews of the tax system such as the 2010 Australia’s Future Tax System Review ('Henry 
Review'), meaningful action aimed at implementing reform to the negative gearing and CGT 
provisions continue to be fraught with political obstacles to change. These policy concerns form 
the primary motivators behind this report.  
The analysis is conducted in three related research phases. First, we present a detailed policy 
audit of Federal income taxes as they relate to property investment and ownership. Second, we 
analysis and validate the distribution of housing tax expenditures associated with existing 
income tax provisions on key housing groups across multiple nationally representative 
datasets—namely, the Survey of Income and Housing (SIH), Household, Income and Labour 
Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) Survey, and the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) sample file. 
Third, we simulate a range of alternative negative gearing and CGT discount scenarios to 
enable comparisons of the distributional and budgetary impacts of reformed and transitional 
arrangements.  
For the policy simulations, we draw on two key pieces of microsimulation modelling 
infrastructure that have complementarities in capability—the Evaluation Model for Incomes and 
Taxes in Australia (EVITA) and the Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute Housing 
Market Microsimulation Model (AHURI-3M). EVITA and AHURI-3M are particularly well-suited to 
simulate the impacts of negative gearing and CGT reforms respectively, including transitional 
arrangements. The former is operationalised on the 2013–14 SIH and the latter on the 2010 
HILDA Survey. 
This report confirms an existing body of knowledge about the distortionary impacts of negative 
gearing and CGT discount arrangement, and the potential of policy reforms to alleviate these 
distortions, with potential benefits for stability and reduction in inequity in the treatment of 
different lower income subgroups versus higher income subgroups in the housing market. 
However, it also offers new findings that are both novel and which add to the policy evidence 
base.  
First, a sample validation exercise conducted across three nationally representative datasets—
the ABS SIH, HILDA Survey and ATO sample file—shows that there is a significant 
underestimation of the number of negatively geared rental investors and net rental losses in 
survey data. As part of this report’s analysis, we have undertaken an intricate benchmarking 
exercise to redistribute net rental losses across rental investors in SIH, so that the distribution of 
net rental losses in the SIH are better aligned with the ATO data.  
Second, this report has modelled several potential transitional arrangements that may ease the 
distribution pressures arising from reforms to negative gearing and CGT reform, and help 
smooth a reform pathway that is more politically acceptable. Importantly, a complete abolition of 
negative gearing reforms has often been criticised by policy-makers for its potentially adverse 
impacts on the financial wellbeing of ‘mum and dad’ investors. In a series of simulations, we 
distinguish between ‘mum and dad’ and ‘sophisticated’ investors and apply more generous 
AHURI Final Report No. 295 6 
concessions to the former so that they are less likely to exit the rental market in response to a 
negative gearing reform that results in a reduction in rental deductions. Such a measure is 
therefore also a potential transitional arrangement that could ease the pathway towards a 
complete negative gearing quarantine for all rental investors over time. 
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1  Introduction 
 This report develops and models pathways to reform the income tax treatment of 
housing assets focusing in particular on negative gearing and capital gains tax 
provisions. 
 The existing literature has highlighted concerns around the potentially 
distortionary effects of the present Federal income tax treatment of housing 
assets on housing market stability and housing affordability. Personal income 
tax concessions distort investment decisions, with adverse implications for the 
distribution of housing assets and outcomes in the housing market. 
 The presence of debt financed housing investors on a large scale is a potential source of 
instability in the housing market.  
 It would appear that property investors are increasingly crowding out first home buyers from 
the property market.  
 The asymmetric tax treatment of rental income and capital gains favour high tax bracket 
investors at the expense of low tax bracket investors.  
 The main residence exemption, under which a primary residence is exempt from capital 
gains tax, can reduce mobility of labour supply.  
 There are three related research phases:  
 a policy audit of Federal income taxes as they relate to property investment and ownership  
 analysis and validation of the distribution of housing tax expenditures associated with 
existing income tax provisions on key housing groups across multiple datasets  
 simulation of alternative reform scenarios to enable comparisons of the distributional and 
budgetary impacts of reformed and transitional arrangements.  
1.1 Why this research was conducted  
This report develops and models pathways to reform the income tax treatment of housing 
assets. It will focus on key tax arrangements that have featured prominently in national policy 
debates as having the potential to exacerbate distortions in property markets, including negative 
gearing arrangements and capital gains tax (CGT) provisions. In doing so, this project will 
inform the development of policies that seek to enhance the fairness and sustainability of the 
income tax treatment of housing in Australia. 
The research project seeks to address four key research questions that shed light on the 
distributional and revenue consequences of current and potential Federal income tax 
parameters for individual (not institutional) investors: 
1 How do existing elements of the Federal income tax system (in particular the availability of 
deductions and CGT provisions) potentially impact on housing ownership and affordability? 
2 Which investor groups, household types and housing market segments benefit or are 
disadvantaged by current negative gearing and CGT provisions?  
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3 What are the revenue and distributional impacts of different negative gearing and CGT 
reform scenarios on housing investors and the Federal budget?  
4 What potential transitional arrangements might minimise the revenue and distributional 
pressures during the process of reform?  
1.2 Policy context  
Under current income tax arrangements, the market supply of rental housing is dominated by 
private individuals, often characterised as ‘mum and dad’ investors. There is comparatively little 
institutional or corporate investment, as companies and investment funds receive few tax 
advantages from rental property investment compared to individual investors (Wood, Ong et al. 
2010). This section provides a brief overview of the key Federal income tax provisions that 
affect individual landlords in order to clarify the policy context behind the project’s research 
questions. More details regarding the income tax treatment of housing assets are provided in 
Chapter 2’s policy audit. 
1.2.1 Negative gearing 
Negative gearing provisions can clearly generate tax shelter benefits for individual landlords. 
Investors can deduct from assessable income ongoing expenses pertaining to their rental 
property. If these expenses exceed gross rental income, the loss made on the rental property 
can be deducted from other sources of tax assessable income, resulting in what is commonly 
referred to as negatively gearing an investment property (Wood, Ong et al. 2011).  
Indeed, the scale of negative gearing that occurs in the residential rental market is immense—
estimates from the 2013–14 Australian Taxation Office (ATO) sample file show that there were 
over 1.2 million negatively geared property investors in that year, making up 63 per cent of all 
property investors. Indeed, Figure 1 below shows that both the share and number of negatively 
geared investors has been rising over the long-run. Between 1993–94 and 2013–14, the 
percentage of negatively geared investors rose from 50 per cent to 62 per cent, though it did 
peak during the housing market boom of the mid-2000s reaching about 70 per cent in 2006–07 
before declining back to 63 per cent. Over the 20-year period, the number of negatively geared 
investors has more than doubled from 500,000 to over 1.2 million. 
AHURI Final Report No. 295 9 
Figure 1: Percentage and number of property investors who are negative geared, 1993–
94 to 2013–14 
Source: ATO Taxation Statistics 1993–94 to 2013–14. 
Tax concessions for outgoings on property exist in different forms across various countries. In a 
minority of countries tax concessions are available for mortgage interest on the taxpayer’s 
residence, but this concession may be linked to imputed rent provisions, including the 
Netherlands and Switzerland; or restricted through other means, for example the USA caps the 
value of the loan (Andrews and Sanchez 2011; Yates 2010b). 
In other countries, including Australia, a property must be producing income for an interest 
deduction to be allowed.  
It would appear that Australia has some of the most generous negative gearing provisions 
within the OECD with few restrictions, along with Japan and New Zealand (Productivity 
Commission 2004). While the Federal government quarantined negative gearing provisions in 
1985, this quarantining provision was repealed after just two years (O’Donnell 2005). On the 
other hand, some other countries have stricter negative gearing provisions. For instance, in the 
United States where a property is an income-producing property, rental losses are only 
claimable against rental income, as income from renting out a property is usually considered as 
passive income (Daley and Wood 2016; Wood, Stewart et al. 2010). In yet other countries, such 
as the Netherlands, a wealth tax is applied to investment properties, therefore negative gearing 
provisions do not exist (Productivity Commission 2004). 
1.2.2 Capital gains tax concessions 
While Australian home owners do not enjoy the benefits of negative gearing the family home, 
they do receive a full exemption from CGT when they sell the home. If a landlord sells an 
investment property, only 50 per cent of the capital gains are taxable at the landlord’s marginal 
income tax rate (MITR).  
The CGT was introduced with effect from 1985 by the Income Tax Assessment Amendment 
(Capital Gains) Act 1986. Until the Ralph review (1999), capital gains on investment properties 
were taxed at their real values at the property investor’s MITR. Following the review, the CGT 
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system was reformed so that 50 per cent of capital gains would be taxed at nominal values. The 
motivation behind this reform was to encourage greater levels of property investment (Daley 
and Wood 2016).  
In the 2016–17 year the foregone revenue from the CGT discount to individuals and trusts is 
estimated to be $9,610 million (Treasury 2017). This is not segregated into assets classes, but it 
has been estimated that in 2013–14 nearly 40 per cent of capital gains received by individuals 
related to real estate (Daley and Wood 2016). 
The combination of generous negative gearing provisions and the capital gains tax discount 
(CGT) has encouraged debt-financed property purchase by investors to chase speculative 
capital gains that are lightly taxed in comparison to ordinary sources of income (Wood, Ong et 
al. 2011). 
Combined with negative gearing, individual investors are encouraged to debt finance their 
investment property to chase capital gains that are in turn lightly taxed upon sale, in comparison 
to taxable income from other sources.  
1.2.3 Potential distortionary effects  
The existing literature has highlighted concerns around the potentially distortionary effects of the 
present Federal income tax treatment of housing assets. These broadly relate to housing 
market stability and housing affordability concerns. 
First, Cassells, Duncan et al. (2015) have highlighted that the share of investment property 
loans in total debt has tripled from one-tenth to three-tenths in approximately two decades. The 
presence of debt-financed housing investors on such a large scale is a potential source of 
instability in the housing market.  
Second, investors now take up an increasingly greater share of the value of new loans 
compared to owner occupiers including first home buyers. Hence, it would appear that property 
investors are increasingly crowding out first home buyers from the property market (James, 
Rowley et al. 2015). Further, owner occupiers are able to access the main residence exemption 
on capital gains on the sale of their principal residence. This can distort the housing market by 
encouraging over investment in housing assets by established home owners (Kelly 2013).  
Third, companies are taxed on all capital gains, like other income, at a flat rate of 30 per cent 
and superannuation funds that comply with Federal regulatory requirements are taxed at a rate 
of 15 per cent (and are only eligible for a 33.3% discount) on capital gains. These tax 
arrangements may deter institutional investment in rental housing as they make it more difficult 
for companies, property funds and financial institutions to obtain satisfactory returns on 
residential housing portfolios than ‘mum and dad’ investors. The lack of institutional investment 
can be a potentially significant factor contributing to the shortage of affordable rental housing 
(Wood, Ong et al. 2010).  
Fourth, the asymmetric tax treatment of rental income and capital gains favour high tax bracket 
investors at the expense of low tax bracket investors. These market imperfections create rent 
clientele effects, whereby rental submarkets with high expected capital appreciation rates will 
attract high tax bracket investors because they pay lower taxes on capital gains than if they 
receive an equivalent sum in rental income. In contrast, in rental submarkets with low expected 
capital gains, high tax bracket investor demand will be weak, so property prices will fall. Low tax 
bracket investors will only invest in relatively low value rental housing that attracts rents that are 
high in relation to property values. This pushes up rents relative to property values in low value 
segments of the rental market, making rental housing more expensive and therefore less 
affordable in precisely those segments where lower income households typically seek housing 
(Wood and Tu 2004; Wood, Ong et al. 2010).  
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Fifth, the main residence exemption, under which a primary residence is exempt from capital 
gains tax, can also result in distortions in the housing market. It may influence the timing of the 
home-owner's decision to sell or retain a property, which may reduce mobility of labour supply; 
to improve the property to maximise tax free capital gains, or to sell in a rising market to realise 
a significant tax free capital gain.  
In short, personal income tax concessions distort investment decisions, with adverse 
implications for the distribution of housing assets and outcomes in the housing market. Despite 
periodic national reviews of the tax system, such as the 2010 Australia’s Future Tax System 
Review ('Henry' Review), meaningful action aimed at implementing reform to the negative 
gearing and CGT provisions continue to be fraught with political obstacles to change. These 
policy concerns form the primary motivators behind the research project.  
1.3 Research methods  
There are three related research phases:  
 a policy audit of Federal income taxes as they relate to property investment and ownership, 
assessing the effect of existing policies on housing markets as well as potential income tax 
reform principles that could enhance the fairness and sustainability of the housing tax regime 
(Chapter 2)  
 analysis and validation of the distribution of housing tax expenditures associated with 
existing income tax provisions on key housing groups across multiple datasets (Chapter 3) 
 simulation of alternative reform scenarios based on different tax bases, rates and thresholds 
including comparisons of the distributional and budgetary impacts under current, reformed 
and transitional arrangements (Chapter 4).  
1.3.1 Policy audit  
The policy audit considers the provisions in the current tax system that have an impact on 
property ownership and investment. These include: capital gains tax (CGT) and the 50 per cent 
CGT discount for personal taxpayers, negative gearing and the main residence exemption. 
Capital works and decline in value provisions are also considered. 
The policy audit is based on a review of specific provisions in the Income Tax Assessment Act 
1997 (Cth) (ITAA97) as well as Taxation Rulings, literature and secondary commentary 
concerning these provisions. The key policy changes relevant to this project included the 
implementation of the capital gains tax in 1985 and the introduction of the CGT discount in 
1999. The audit included policy proposals published during the 2016 Federal Election and 
modelling and commentary evaluating those proposals. 
1.3.2 Data analysis and validation  
The report’s overall empirical analysis relies strongly on the 2013–14 Australian Bureau of 
Statistics (ABS) Survey of Income and Housing (SIH), followed by the 2001–11 Household, 
Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) Survey.  
The SIH is a cross-sectional survey that collects detailed information on household income and 
wealth, and housing outcomes. It also contains details on household and personal 
characteristics. Since 2003–04, the SIH has been conducted every two years. The SIH sample 
covers residents of private dwellings across urban and rural areas. The 2013–14 SIH sample 
included 14,162 households comprising 27,339 household members aged 15 years old and 
over (ABS 2015).  
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The HILDA survey is a nationally representative panel survey, which began in 2001 by 
interviewing 7,682 households comprising nearly 14,000 adult responding household members. 
These adult members were then re-interviewed in every subsequent year, to enable tracking of 
variations in their life circumstances, personal characteristics and experiences over time. This is 
done through a comprehensive range of variables on socio-demographic characteristics, 
household and income dynamics, housing outcomes, labour market outcomes, and measures 
of subjective wellbeing.  
Both the SIH and HILDA Survey are initially benchmarked against data from the ATO sample 
files to assess the extent to which respondent reporting in the two surveys diverge from tax 
reporting to the ATO. The ATO sample file has been released every year from 2003–04. The 
sample files provide individual tax return information for a 1 per cent sample of records from 
2003–04 to 2010–11, and 2 per cent sample from 2011–12 onwards.1 It turns out that there are 
systematic biases in reporting in the survey data. Chapter 3 details steps that we have taken to 
minimise the impact of these biases on our results, particularly with respect to the 2013–14 SIH. 
1.3.3 Modelling  
The 2010 review of Australia’s Future Tax System (the ‘Henry’ Review) notes the difficulties in 
assessing the overall impacts of Australian taxes and payments on housing market dynamics 
due to the 'complex ways in which tax-transfer policies interact with the housing market' (Henry, 
Harmer et al. 2010: Section 10). This report’s methodology, which offers the capacity to link 
detailed income tax policy settings to housing market outcomes, is facilitated through 
microsimulation modelling, the results of which are presented in Chapter 4.  
Microsimulation models are frequently employed by academics and policy-makers to predict the 
impacts of reforms to tax and transfer parameters on individuals, households and government 
budgets. The model is designed to simulate the parameters of the tax-transfer system under 
alternative policy scenarios for a sample of individuals. The outcomes of the simulations assist 
policy-makers with making decisions on whether or not particular policies ought to be 
implemented. This is because microsimulation modelling enables identification of winners and 
losers under alternative policy scenarios, and supports the analysis of distributional and 
budgetary impacts of potential policy reforms.  
This report identifies proposed policy reforms through the policy audit in Chapter 2. A selection 
of these reforms are modelled using microsimulation modelling approaches in Chapter 4 that 
estimate first round impacts to accurately assess the household level implications of reforms as 
well as aggregate budgetary impacts. In particular, we draw on two key pieces of 
microsimulation modelling infrastructure that have complementarities in capability—with EVITA 
particularly well-suited to modelling the impacts of negative gearing and AHURI-3M the impacts 
of CGT reform, including transitional arrangements. 
Evaluation Model for Incomes and Taxes in Australia (EVITA) 
The Evaluation Model for Incomes and Taxes in Australia (EVITA) is a detailed income tax and 
transfer microsimulation model, developed by the Bankwest Curtin Economics Centre. EVITA 
provides a unique capacity to model both distributional and behavioural impacts of reforms to 
the full Australian tax and transfer system.  
The model allows for the detailed investigation of the effects of policy changes to a wide variety 
of components in the transfer payment and income tax systems on individuals and households. 
                                               
 
1 See https://data.gov.au/dataset/taxation-statistics-individual-sample-files for further details. 
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Detailed changes and additions can be made to payment rates, income tests, assets tests, 
and/or rent assistance. The model currently runs on the 2013–14 SIH.  
It turns out that reported net rental losses in the 2013–14 SIH under-represent the reported net 
rental losses by taxpayers to the ATO as does the HILDA Survey (see Chapter 3 for more 
details). The EVITA model has been designed to alleviate the bias in net rental loss estimates in 
the 2013–14 SIH through a net rental income redistribution module, so it is uniquely well-suited 
to simulate the impacts of negative gearing policy reforms with a high degree of accuracy. 
However, due to the cross-sectional nature of the SIH, it is not possible to observe the capital 
gain of properties that, when sold, would in turn attract a CGT discount. Hence, the EVITA 
model is more limited with respect to its capability to simulate the impacts of CGT reform. 
These new methodological developments substantially improve our capacity to model the 
distributional impacts of negative gearing reforms. However, it is important also to note the 
limitations of microsimulation methods in housing tax policy analysis.  
Behavioural tax microsimulation is well suited to capture employment responses to tax and 
welfare reforms. However, there are far more complexities in modelling the behavioural impacts 
of housing tax policy reforms. This is a function of i) the breadth of agents involved in housing 
choices—renters, owners, investors, the housing industry, governments; ii) the complexity of 
decisions related to housing choice—many of which take place in a life-cycle context; iii) the 
complexity of the housing market itself; and iv) the scale and significance of many housing tax 
policy instruments.  
In consequence, the behavioural effects of negative gearing policies on housing supply; housing 
market entry, duration and exit; and housing price, are beyond the scope of this AHURI-funded 
project. Nevertheless, this limitation does highlight the pressing need for a major modelling 
initiative to capture housing market dynamics, including the influence of housing tax policies. 
Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute Housing Market Microsimulation 
Model (AHURI-3M) 
AHURI-3M is an Australian housing market microsimulation model. It is benchmarked on the 
2001–11 HILDA Survey. It contains detailed tax, benefit and housing assistance parameters for 
every year over the period 2001–11. It was recently used to estimate the magnitude and 
distribution of housing subsidies as part of the Henry Review of the Australian Tax System 
(Wood, Stewart et al. 2010). The microsimulation model has also been used to estimate the 
magnitude and distribution of negative gearing (Wood, Ong et al. 2011), low-income housing tax 
credits—a forerunner of NRAS in the USA (Wood, Watson et al. 2006), as well as the role of tax 
subsidies in driving tenure choice (Hendershott, Ong et al. 2009) and the supply of rental 
housing (Wood and Ong 2013). It has therefore established itself as an important tool for the 
distributional analysis of the tax treatment of housing assets.  
As noted above, it is not possible to observe the sale of properties by rental investors that would 
in turn attract a CGT discount in the SIH. Because the sale of a property that attracts a CGT is a 
one-off transaction rather than a recurrent transaction, an alternative approach of measuring the 
impact of CGT (and CGT reforms) on rental investors’ economic outcomes is to amortise capital 
gains tax liabilities across the investor’s holding period (Wood and Ong 2010; Wood, Ong et al. 
2011; Wood and Ong 2013). AHURI-3M contains a rental investors module operationalised on 
three of HILDA’s wealth modules—in 2002, 2006 and 2010—that specifically measure the after-
tax economic cost of supply rental housing borne by rental investors, also commonly known as 
'the user cost of capital'. It is usually measured per dollar of capital value. The key components 
of the user cost typically comprise recurrent and capital components, with the latter amortised 
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over a holding period of 10 years. The recurrent components include annual financing costs,2 
annual operating costs3 and annual capital gains, while the amortised capital components 
include the amortised value of CGT liability and transaction costs. Details on measurement of 
the key components of the user cost are laid out in Wood and Ong (2008). Hence, it is 
exceptionally well-suited for modelling the impacts of CGT reform, though less so for negative 
gearing reforms due to the under-reporting of net rental losses in the HILDA Survey. 
                                               
 
2 The financing costs include after-tax interest on mortgage debt and the after-tax return sacrificed on the rental 
investor’s equity stake in the property. 
3 Operating costs include maintenance costs, property taxes and land taxes. 
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2 Income taxes and affordability: an audit of current 
policies 
 The Australian tax system is asymmetrical in respect of both owner-occupied 
and own-to-invest properties. 
 Owner-occupied properties are exempt from many taxes, including capital gains 
tax. There is no imputed rent applied to claw back the exemption. 
 In respect of own-to-invest properties, it allows a deduction on revenue account 
for the ongoing costs of holding a rental property, while only including a reduced 
amount of income from the sale of that property. This asymmetry encourages 
borrowing to invest in property from rent, as the cost of finance is subsidised, 
and the amount of capital gain after repaying borrowed funds is magnified, even 
after repaying borrowed funds. 
 The highest categories of expenses that are claimed by landlords include 
mortgage interest, capital works and depreciation deductions, all of which are 
arguably related to the capital value of the property—and may in fact be included 
in the cost base for CGT purposes if not previously claimed. Although 
depreciation deductions are clawed back on sale of the property, other 
deductions claimed while the property is rented are not accounted for in 
calculating the capital gain. 
This chapter addresses the following research question: 
How do existing elements of the Federal income tax system (in particular the availability of 
deductions and CGT provisions) potentially impact on housing ownership and affordability? 
2.1 What we already know about the effect of the income tax 
system  
Existing research has identified the asymmetrical nature of negative gearing, which is on the 
revenue account, and the subsequent gain on the sale of property, which is on the capital 
account. The most significant tax benefit arises from the discounted nature of capital gains tax, 
which was introduced in 1999.  
In order to address the research question that is the subject of this chapter, a policy audit has 
been undertaken of the relevant income tax provisions that underpin the housing market in 
relation to owner-occupiers and investors. 
There are several features of the Australian tax system that have an impact on taxpayers’ 
decisions concerning housing and, in, turn, the housing market. These include the main 
residence exemption from capital gains tax (CGT), which is restricted to owner-occupied 
housing; and the 50 per cent CGT discount for individuals, negative gearing and capital works 
write-offs that are available to a range of capital investments including housing investments.  
Tenants who rent housing do not receive any preferential tax treatment directly, although it is 
possible that some of the tax preferences received by landlords are passed indirectly to renters 
in the form of reduced rents in comparison to those that would apply absent the tax preferences. 
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Wood and Ong (2010: 5) described tax preferences as 'a pervasive influence in housing 
markets'. They noted that investors in a high income tax bracket benefit more from negative 
gearing. Berry and Dalton (2004) noted that differential impacts of CGT, income tax and GST 
regimes exert complex distributional and efficiency effects on housing markets. 
2.2 The income tax treatment of capital gains 
2.2.1 Owning to occupy 
The main residence exemption in subdivision 118-B of the ITAA97 narrows the overall tax base 
and results in an effective tax rate of zero on owner-occupied housing. Internationally there are 
a range of tax expenditures available to owner occupiers, including:  
 deductibility of mortgage interest, with few of those countries imputing a rent against the 
mortgage interest (Andrews and Sanchez 2011) 
 full exemption from capital gains tax, for example Canada 
or  
 partial exemption from CGT for a taxpayer’s main residence; for example, currently the 
principal residence exemption in the USA is $US250,000 for singles and $US500,000 for 
couples (US Internal Revenue Code § 121). 
The main residence exemption constitutes the largest tax expenditure (Treasury 2017). The two 
components of the main residence exemption are estimated to cost $54,500 million in 2015–16. 
Other consequences of the main residence exemption include: 
 too much capital being invested in housing and not enough in other assets (Burman and 
White 2010)  
 the main residence exemption is of greater value to high-income taxpayers and, therefore, 
vertically inequitable (Cooper and Evans 2014) 
 it is not tenure-neutral, resulting in differences in the treatment of owner-occupied and rental 
housing (Yates 2010a) 
 incomes of homeowners are increased by the value of the shelter and other services they 
receive from their owner-occupied housing (Ozanne 2012).  
The imputation of rent notionally attributes income against housing tax concessions, introducing 
neutrality between owner-occupied and investor housing. Irrespective of its merits or otherwise, 
it is highly unlikely that the taxation of imputed rent will be reintroduced in Australia. 
2.2.2 Owning to invest: capital gains tax discount 
The taxation treatment of capital gains held by an individual or a trustee depends on the date of 
acquisition and the CGT event resulting in the disposal of the asset. 
 The gain on assets acquired before 20 September 1985 are exempt. 
 The gain on assets held for less than 12 months are taxed in full. 
 Assets acquired before 21 September 1999 but sold after that date may be taxed on the 
basis of an inflation indexed gain (Div 114 ITAA 97). 
 Assets acquired and sold after 21 September 1999 are eligible for a discount of 50 per cent 
on the gain on sale (Div 115 ITAA 97). 
The former Howard Government introduced the 50 per cent CGT discount on the 
recommendation of the 1999 Ralph Review of Business Taxation (Ralph 1999), which 
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recommended the introduction of the discount 'to enliven and invigorate the Australian equities 
markets, to stimulate greater participation by individuals, and to achieve a better allocation of 
the nation’s capital resources' (Ralph 1999: 598).  
The capital gains tax discount for individuals and trusts is a significant tax expenditure, 
estimated at $6.84 billion in 2016–17. 
The CGT discount is a tax expenditure that is inequitable in its distributional impact. It is counter 
to the traditional tax policy principles of horizontal and vertical equity and it can create 
incentives for economically inefficient tax sheltering whereby ordinary income is re-
characterised as capital.  
Concerns about vertical equity, related to CGT rate preferences, arise from the fact that most of 
the benefits of CGT rate preferences are derived by taxpayers with high taxable incomes, since 
most capital gains are accrued and realised by this taxpayer demographic. Therefore, a CGT 
rate preference such as the CGT discount would generally result in a vertically inequitable tax 
system, since the benefits of the preference are concentrated at higher levels of income, given 
the skewed way in which capital gains are distributed. 
CGT rate preferences, such as the CGT discount, may also lead to horizontal inequity since 
there is an unequal distribution of the tax burden among those taxpayers with the same taxable 
income, but who have differing proportions of capital gains to total taxable income, although 
Shaviro (1992–93), argues that horizontal equity is not necessarily a criterion against which 
CGT should be evaluated.  
The Review of Australia’s Future Tax System ('Henry' Review) recommended a ‘savings income 
discount’ of 40 per cent for capital gains and other returns on investment including net rental 
income (Henry, Harmer et al. 2010, Recommendation 14: 83). The Henry Review noted that 
extending the discount rate to net rental income would result in a more neutral treatment of 
investment in housing and generally better outcomes for taxpayers who are not as reliant on 
debt-financed investment in housing. According to the Henry Review, 'the tax system is unlikely 
to be an effective instrument to move housing prices toward a particular desired level and the 
tax system is not the appropriate tool for addressing the impact of other policies on housing 
affordability' (Henry, Harmer et al. 2010: 420). 
Brown, Brown et al. (2011) estimated the user cost of housing. Based on the findings in their 
study, Brown, Brown et al. commented on the 50 per cent CGT discount, negative gearing and 
the principal residence CGT exemption (which they characterised as a 100% CGT 
discount).They argued that negative gearing provisions may be less distortive than the CGT 
concessions. Specifically, it is their conclusion that although the negative gearing provisions 
provide for similar treatment of housing and other forms of investment, the CGT discount and 
principal residence exemption provide for differential treatment compared to capital gains held 
for less than 12 months. 
2.3 The income tax treatment of rental expenses 
2.3.1 Negative gearing 
As explained in section 1.2.1, negative gearing is a term that is used to refer to a scenario 
where the owner or owners of a rental property claim income tax deductions that exceed the 
revenue received from that property.  
Negative gearing, per se, is not a tax expenditure. A tax expenditure 'arises where the actual tax 
treatment of an activity or class of taxpayer differs from the benchmark tax treatment' (Treasury 
2017). Other than to the extent that the expenses claimed include capital works deductions, 
negative gearing results from the normal operation of the Income Tax Assessment Acts.  
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In a paper that examined negative gearing in first- and second-best scenarios, Fane and 
Richardson (2004: 220) concluded that negative gearing is ‘something that would be allowed in 
a system that taxed real income, properly measured'. They also concluded that the tax 
treatment of capital gains is a major loophole in a scenario where house prices increase rapidly. 
Taxation Statistics (ATO 2017: 3) show that in relation to individuals, in the 2013–14 year 
2,842,139 rental schedules were lodged. Of these, some 60 per cent claimed losses. The mean 
loss amount claimed was $6,700; and the mean profit amount was $6,928.  
Hulse and Burke (2015) noted that some organisations that represent property owners have 
argued that negative gearing may meet increased demand for private rental property and that it 
may increase supply and, in turn, moderate rental costs.  
According to Hulse, Burke et al. (2012: 17), negative gearing was a ‘relatively little known and 
used tax provision’ to the point that it may have been considered ‘invisible in the early 1980s’. 
They argue that an increased proportion of investors in housing became aware of negative 
gearing due to the reversal of the quarantining rules by the then Labor government in 1987. 
Hulse, Burke et al. (2012) argued that negative gearing may increase demand pressures and 
the inflation of housing prices to the extent that most investment to which negative gearing 
applies is in existing housing stock rather than in newly constructed dwellings. 
Warren (2003) noted that although the tax-preferred status of residential housing ‘must be 
addressed’, there would be negative consequences associated with removing all concessions 
on housing, one of these being that their capitalised value would 'come off property prices 
almost immediately'. 
The highest categories of rental expenses claimed by landlords; and the expenses most likely to 
be claimed by landlords reporting a loss are interest expenditure, depreciation and capital works 
claims.  
2.3.2 Interest deductions 
A rental investor can earn a higher rate of return on their investment by leveraging their initial 
investment, even without the benefit of annual tax losses.  
Since 1967 the ATO has determined that interest charges are deductible where the amount 
payable exceeded the expected income (ATO 1967).  
In order to be deductible under s.8–1 of ITAA 97: 
 TR 2000/2 requires that there must be a direct nexus between the expense and the income: 
the borrowed money must have been applied to earn the assessable income: the 'use test' 
(ATO 2000).  
 IT 2167 states that the deduction may be only partly allowed where there is clearly a purpose 
other than the derivation of assessable income, but that it will depend on the circumstances 
of each case, and must be determined objectively (ATO 1985).  
 TR 95/33 addresses the issue of negative gearing as follows: 
Negatively gearing the acquisition of an income producing asset will require a 
consideration of all the circumstances of the case in order to decide how much, if any, 
of the interest expense is deductible under subsection 51(1). In the commonly 
encountered kinds of circumstances where assets are negatively geared, a common 
sense or practical weighing of all the factors surrounding the acquisition could be 
expected to lead to the conclusion that the relevant interest expense is properly to be 
characterised as genuinely, and not colourably, incurred in gaining or producing the 
assessable income and will fall entirely within either the first or second limb of 
subsection 51(1) (ATO 1995 at paragraph 16). 
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In reviewing interest deductions from negatively-geared rental property from a tax policy 
perspective, O’Donnell (2005: 103) concluded that negative gearing had increased income 
inequality and had led to 'a disproportionately high level of housing finance invested in rental 
properties'. O’Donnell recommended that interest deductions from negatively geared housing be 
quarantined on an ‘asset by asset’ basis, with a carry forward of losses to be offset against 
future income and capital gains from the same asset. It was also noted by O’Donnell that the 
argument that negative gearing may cause lower rents due to an increased supply of rental 
properties and lower costs for landlords was one which was based on false assumptions. 
2.3.3 Capital works 
Most relevant capital expenditure falls for consideration under either Division 40 ITAA97 in 
respect of depreciating assets that reduce in value over time, or Division 43 ITAA97 for capital 
works. Under the capital works provisions, the cost of certain buildings and related expenditure 
can be deducted over either 25 or 40 years as long as the property is used for income 
producing purposes.  
Many residential rental properties are not eligible for the capital works deduction. No tax 
deduction was available for capital works completed prior to 1979, and capital works in relation 
to rental properties are not deductible on buildings completed prior to 1985. 
The effective life of capital works is generally longer than the 25 or 40 years over which the 
capital works are deducted. Accordingly the capital works deduction is reported as a tax 
expenditure which is estimated to cost $1,000 million in the 2015–16 year; and to increase by 
an additional $35 million in each of the following years included in the estimates (Treasury 
2017). 
2.3.4 Depreciation 
A fixture to property that is not classified as capital works is likely to be considered as a 
depreciating asset. A depreciating asset is defined in s.40–30 ITAA97 as an asset that has a 
limited effective life and can reasonably be expected to decline in value over the period it is 
used, but it specifically excludes land. Accordingly a fixture to land will not be a depreciating 
asset. 
Depreciation is not classified as a tax expenditure unless the deduction is accelerated under a 
specific measure. The tax expenditure benchmark for depreciation deductions is that the plant is 
depreciated over the effective life of the asset. However, timing issues can arise as the 
deduction claimed each year may not equal the actual reduction in the value of the asset, and 
the difference is adjusted on disposal by way of a balancing charge.  
The 2017–18 Budget includes proposals to restrict deductions for depreciating assets that are 
acquired with an investment property, however these proposals are not yet law. 
2.4 Interaction between negative gearing and capital gains tax 
The most significant income tax measures relevant to investment in housing are CGT and 
negative gearing, and the relationship between the two. 
The interaction of the capital gains discount with negative gearing results in a timing mismatch; 
deductions are claimed on an annual basis, and allowed against income from other sources, 
whereas the capital gain is taxed at a later point in time, when the gain on the sale is realised. 
This is further compounded by the availability of the CGT discount. 
The mismatch between income and deductions for rental property was identified prior to the 
enactment of capital gains tax (Krever 1985), and was one of the reasons for the introduction of 
the capital gains tax in 1985. Specifically, prior to September 1985 capital gains were not 
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subject to tax. Clearly, in the case of rental property investment part of the investor’s return is in 
the form of capital gains. Therefore at that time, there was a case for denying rental property 
deductions to the extent that the expenses had been incurred in earning capital gains. The 
introduction of the capital gains tax in 1985 addressed this asymmetry, but the concessional tax 
treatment of capital gains since September 1999, by way of the CGT discount, has arguably 
restored the ‘loophole’ referred to by Krever. 
The 50 per cent CGT discount has a distorting effect on investment decisions as it creates a tax 
advantage for assets where most of the return is in the form of capital gains in comparison to 
assets which have a greater part of their return in the form of income. Housing is clearly an 
asset type which is in the former category. In aggregate in 2013–14 taxpayers claimed tax 
losses from rental property investments. That is, the net income return from rental property for 
the entire taxpayer population was negative. The aggregate taxpayer population reporting net 
rental losses has occurred in almost all income tax years during which the 50 per cent CGT 
discount has been in operation. There were several income tax years prior to 1999–2000, when 
the CGT discount was enacted, in which there was net income from rental property for the 
aggregate individual taxpayer population. 
Grudnoff (2015) estimated that the benefits of the CGT discount and negative gearing are highly 
skewed in favour of high-income taxpayers. Wood and Ong (2010) noted that there is a larger 
tax shelter benefit of negative gearing for taxpayers in higher tax brackets. 
Wood, Ong et al. (2016) noted that tax preferences used by investors can contribute to 
distortions in the supply of private rental housing. Specifically, taxpayers in the top marginal tax 
rate bracket benefit more from negative gearing and the CGT discount compared to taxpayers 
in other tax rate brackets and, consequently, they can supply rental housing at a lower cost 
(Wood, Ong et al. 2016). 
2.5 International comparison 
Internationally, owner occupiers obtain a range of tax concessions. Yates (2010b: 42) sets out 
the tax treatment of deductions that can be claimed by investors as follows: 
Table 1: International comparison of tax regimes (investors) 
Country Interest 
Deduction 
Negative 
Gearing 
Capital Works CGT Land 
Tax 
Australia Yes Yes Yes, if built 
after 1985 
50 per cent Yes 
Canada Yes Limited to cash 
outlays 
Yes: 
Recouped on 
sale 
50 per cent Yes 
France Yes Capped + Interest 
cannot > gross 
rent 
Yes Exempt if held 
> 15 years 
Limited 
Germany No Yes Yes Exempt if held 
> 10 years 
Limited 
Netherlands Wealth tax levied based on assumed rate of return Yes 
New Zealand Yes Yes Yes No Limited 
Sweden Yes Yes No Limited  Yes 
Switzerland Yes No Outlays Yes Yes 
UK Phasing out 
by 2020–21 
No No Yes Yes 
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Country Interest 
Deduction 
Negative 
Gearing 
Capital Works CGT Land 
Tax 
US Yes Not allowed 
against labour 
income 
Yes Yes yes 
Source: Yates 2010b. 
Daley and Wood (2016) noted that Australia’s treatment of rental property losses is generous 
given that comparable countries, including the United States and the United Kingdom, impose 
limitations that disallow rental losses being offset against labour income. They recommended a 
reduction in the magnitude of the CGT discount from 50 per cent to 25 per cent and 
quarantining rules that would prevent taxpayers from offsetting rental property losses against 
labour income. 
2.6 Policy implications of the research  
The policy audit has shown that the income tax treatment of investment property provides an 
annual tax deduction to the owners of negatively geared property that subsidises the holding 
cost of property. This deduction is made up of a combination of cash outgoings, of which the 
most significant is loan interest, and capital allowances which are non-cash expenses. 
In contrast, when the property is sold the gain is included on the capital account. The amount is 
included on realisation and is subject to a discount of 50 per cent when derived by an individual 
or a trustee, or 33 per cent when derived by a superannuation fund. 
The policy audit identified:  
 a mismatch in the timing of the deduction and the capital gain with the deductions predating 
the capital gain  
 the amount of the rental deduction is not discounted whereas the capital gain is discounted. 
This combination of factors provides an incentive for the owners of investment properties to 
borrow a larger proportion of the acquisition price as the interest deduction is allowed in full 
whereas only 50 per cent of the capital gain is included. A leveraged investment will result in a 
higher capital gain where the growth in property prices exceeds the interest rate. 
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3 Negative gearing and capital gains tax: a distributional 
analysis  
A sample validation exercise is conducted across three nationally representative 
datasets, the ABS SIH, HILDA Survey and ATO sample file. The total number of 
rental investors are similar across the three datasets at around 2 million. However, 
while nearly 61 per cent of rental investors in the ATO data reported a net rental 
loss in 2013–14, much lower proportions have negatively geared status in SIH and 
HILDA.  
We conduct an intricate benchmarking exercise to redistribute net rental losses 
across rental investors in SIH, so that the distribution of net rental losses in the SIH 
are better aligned with the ATO data. 
The typical negatively-geared investor is male, aged in his mid-to-late forties, and 
employed full-time. On the other hand, positively-geared investors tend to be 
evenly split between males and females and more likely to be older and retired.  
Negatively-geared investors have higher tax assessable incomes than positively-
geared investors.  
Rental investment spells that start off being negatively geared are more likely to be 
terminated after 5 years than those that start as positively geared.  
Among negatively-geared investors, those who receive the greatest tax savings are 
also those who have the highest incomes and rental property values, and greatest 
annual net rental losses.  
Home-owner investors who own both a family home and at least one rental 
investment property received the greatest CGT discount benefits, while renters who 
do not own properties do not receive any CGT discount. 
CGT discount benefits are heavily weighted towards those who are more affluent in 
terms of both income and property wealth. On average, a home-owner investor can 
own a property portfolio worth over $730,000. Home-owner investors’ average tax 
assessable income is $82,000 compared to $31,000 among renters who do not own 
any properties.  
This chapter addresses the report’s second research question: 
Which investor groups, household types and housing market segments benefit or are 
disadvantaged by current negative gearing and CGT provisions?  
We begin with a data validation exercise by comparing the 2013–14 SIH and 2013–14 HILDA 
Survey with the 2013–14 ATO 2 per cent sample file. While both SIH and HILDA are nationally 
representative surveys, the data validation exercise is conducted to ensure that respondents 
reporting in the two surveys do not diverge significantly from tax reporting to the ATO. 
Surprisingly, it turns out that the net rental income data in the surveys do diverge systemically 
from ATO net rental income data. However, the policy simulations in Chapter 4 rely on the use 
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of SIH. Hence, we conduct an intricate ‘redistribution of net rental losses in the SIH data to 
better align the reporting of net rental income in SIH with the ATO data. This exercise is an 
innovation offered by the report; to our knowledge it has not been attempted in previous 
Australian empirical work on negative gearing.  
Following the data validation exercise, we offer a detailed distributional analysis to shed light on 
the extent to which different population subgroups benefit from or are disadvantaged by current 
negative gearing and CGT provisions. This is done firstly using the cross-sectional 2013–14 
SIH, and complemented by some panel data analysis using the longitudinal HILDA Survey. 
3.1 Data validation—SIH, HILDA and ATO  
3.1.1 Rental investors 
We begin by aligning the definition of rental investors across the three datasets to ensure that 
they are as consistent with ATO definitions as possible. While the SIH distinguishes between 
rental investors who own resident and non-residential property, the HILDA Survey and ATO do 
not. To maintain consistency with these other key data sources, we include individuals who own 
both types of property. In any case, a comparison of residential and non-residential rental 
investors from the SIH show that the latter are a minority, forming around 4 per cent of all rental 
investors in Australia. Hence, in this report rental investors are defined as individuals who 
currently receive rental income from residential and non-residential rental property. 
All three data sources contain population weights that allow population estimates to be derived 
from the data. Weighted results from the surveys produce rental investor population numbers 
that are fairly consistent, these being 1.77 million in SIH, 1.84 million in HILDA, and 2.03 million 
in the ATO sample file. 
3.1.2 Share of positively-geared, negatively-geared and break-even rental 
investors 
We rely on annualised current weekly rental income in our analysis that draw on the 2013–14 
SIH.4 In the HILDA Survey and ATO data, rental income is reported on a financial year basis 
only.  
Net rental income can be either:  
 positive (when gross rental income exceeds expenses)  
 negative (when expenses exceed gross rental income) 
or  
 nil (when the rental investor breaks even).  
Hence, in all three datasets, it is possible to identify and classify rental investors into:  
 positively-geared (when net rental income is positive)  
 negative-geared (when net rental income is negative)  
 break-even (when net rental income is nil). 
                                               
 
4 While it is also possible to observe net rental income in the SIH on a financial year basis, we have opted to rely 
on annualised currently weekly income so as to reflect the most current estimates available at the time of the 
analysis. Annualised current weekly income in the 2013–14 SIH relate to the year 2013–14, while financial year 
income data in the 2013–14 SIH relate to the year 2012–13. 
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Table 2 below compares the distribution of positively-geared, negatively-geared and break-even 
landlords across the three data sources for the year 2013–14, and reveals some very 
interesting differences. While the total number of rental investors are similar across the three 
datasets (between 1.7 and 2 million), the distribution of the three categories of rental investors 
differs widely between the ATO and the two surveys. 
Focusing on population weighted estimates, we find that nearly 61 per cent of rental investors 
reported a net rental loss in 2013–14. Hence, according to the ATO data, the number of 
negatively-geared investors clearly outweigh the number of positively-geared and break-even 
landlords. On the other hand, in both the SIH and HILDA Surveys, the patterns are very 
different. In the SIH (HILDA Survey), around 48 per cent (35%) of rental investors reported that 
they were negatively geared in 2013–14. Hence, the number and share of negatively-geared 
rental investors are much lower in the SIH and HILDA Surveys than in the ATO data.  
Another worrying difference is that 17 per cent of rental investors in the SIH reported break-
even status, and 11 per cent do so in the HILDA Survey. In contrast, no rental investor reported 
break-even status in the ATO data.  
However, an investigation of the survey questions that underpin the SIH and HILDA net rental 
income variable offers no further details on why there is an under-representation of negatively-
geared rental investors in the SIH and HILDA surveys relative to the ATO data. In the SIH and 
HILDA surveys, rental investors are not required to detail the kinds of expenditure items they 
have taken into account to calculate their net rental income. A conjecture is that rental investors 
who report that they break even are not taking into account non-cash expenses, for example 
depreciation. This implies a potential measurement error issue with respect to rental income in 
SIH and HILDA. This is a data limitation and we embark on an intricate benchmarking exercise 
between the SIH and ATO data. This exercise is designed to redistribute net rental losses 
across rental investors in SIH, so that both the distribution of net rental losses and sum of net 
rental losses in the SIH are better aligned with the ATO data. 
Given the intricate and time-consuming nature of this exercise, we focus on the redistribution of 
net rental losses in the SIH and note for now that an important future research direction is to 
implement the same exercise for all waves of the HILDA Survey. Currently, 15 waves of the 
HILDA Survey are potentially afflicted by an under-reporting of net rental loss.  
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Table 2: Number and distribution of rental investors, 2013–14, per cent by column 
 SIH HILDA ATO 
 Number Per 
cent 
Number Per 
cent 
Number Per cent 
Sample       
Profit  989 35.4% 1,019 54.3% 15,633 39.0% 
Loss  1,289 46.2% 648 34.5% 24,391 60.9% 
Break-even 514 18.2% 209 11.1% 50 0.1% 
Total 2,792 100.0% 1,876 100.0% 40,074 100.0% 
Population        
Profit  627,579 35.5% 1,003,213 54.6% 781,650 39.0% 
Loss  839,870 47.5% 633,091 34.5% 1,219,550 60.9% 
Break-even 301,870 17.1% 201,318 11.0% 2,500 0.1% 
Total 1,769,318 100.0 1,837,622 100.0 2,003,700 100.0% 
Note: Due to the absence of weights in the ATO sample file, each respondent in the sample is given a weight of 
50 to derive population estimates as the sample file is drawn from 2 per cent of the population. 
Source: 2013–14 SIH, 2013 HILDA Survey and 2013–14 ATO 2 per cent sample file 
3.1.3 Redistribution of net rental losses: SIH 
Figure 2 below compares the distribution of net rental losses between the 2013–14 SIH (grey 
bars) and 2013–14 ATO 2 per cent sample file (orange bars) in $1,000 bands. For visual clarity, 
the vertical axis is capped at 200,000 when in fact over 300,000 investors reported zero net 
rental loss in the SIH (see Table 2 above), and the horizontal axis is capped at $45,000 of tax 
assessable income.  
Some clear differences emerge. First, there exists a large number of rental investors in the SIH 
who report zero rental losses compared to almost none in the ATO data. Second, in the SIH, 
net rental losses tend to be under-reported relative to the ATO data in most bands, with the grey 
bars falling below the orange bars in most bands across the distribution. However, some 
clustering of reported net rental losses can be observed in the SIH at $5,000, $10,000, $20,000, 
$25,000 and $30,000—in all these bands, the grey bars exceed the orange bars in height. This 
raises questions around the accuracy of reporting by respondents in the SIH given the 
extensive rounding of loss amounts that appear to have taken place. On the other hand, tax 
reporting often demands greater accuracy and so the ‘clustering’ effect showing up in the SIH 
are not observable in the ATO data.  
As a result, total net rental losses reported by negatively-geared investors appear to be under-
reported in the SIH at $6.28 billion compared to an ATO total rental loss value of $10.97 billion. 
Furthermore, the distribution of total rental losses among negatively-geared investors is 
smoother in the ATO data than the SIH. 
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Figure 2: Distribution of net rental losses, SIH and ATO 2 per cent sample file, 2013–14 
Note: For visual clarity, the vertical axis is capped at 200,000 when in fact over 300,000 investors reported zero net rental loss in the SIH (see Table 2 above), and the horizontal axis 
is capped at $45,000 of tax assessable income. 
Source: 2013–14 SIH and 2013–14 ATO 2 per cent sample file
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The redistribution of net rental losses entail the following steps. We take the sample of rental 
investors who report either zero or negative rental income in the SIH and rank them from lowest 
to highest in terms of the net rental income. We do the same for rental investors in the ATO 
sample file. We then continually redistribute rental investors marginally from one rental income 
loss band to the next one representing a greater rental income loss till we achieve a 
redistributed population weighted sample of SIH rental investors with either zero or negative 
rental income that approximates the distribution of negatively-geared investors in the ATO data. 
At this point, the total adjusted rental losses in the SIH are increased to a level that 
approximates total rental losses in the ATO data. 
Figure 3 below compares the distribution of net rental losses again after the redistribution 
exercise. Once again the horizontal axis is capped at $45,000 of tax assessable income. A 
closer distribution of net rental losses is not apparent between the two datasets. Indeed, on an 
aggregate basis, the adjusted total loss estimates from the ‘adjusted’ SIH rises from 
$6.28 billion to $10.1 billion, which is more comparable with the ATO’s $10.97 billion. Moreover, 
the population number of negatively-geared rental investors rises from 839,870 to 1.15 million 
after the redistribution of net rental losses, which now approximates the 1.26 million negatively-
geared rental investors in the ATO data. 
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Figure 3: Distribution of net rental losses, adjusted SIH and ATO 2 per cent sample file, 2013–14 
 
Note: For visual clarity, the horizontal axis is capped at $45,000 of tax assessable income. 
Source: 2013–14 SIH and 2013–14  ATO 2 per cent sample file
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3.2 Negative gearing 
3.2.1 Characteristics of negatively-geared versus positively-geared investors 
In Table 3 below, we explore the characteristics of rental investors using the 2013–14 ‘adjusted’ 
SIH. We ask ‘what are the typical characteristics of rental investors who use negative gearing 
as opposed to those who do not use negative gearing’. The table reveals that negatively-geared 
and positively-geared investors have somewhat different socio-economic profiles.  
The typical negatively-geared investor is male, aged in his mid-to-late forties and employed full-
time. On the other hand, positively-geared investors tend to be evenly split between males and 
females, they tend to be older (in their mid-fifties), and similar proportions are employed full-time 
or not in the labour force (NILF) indicating that many of these investors are in the retirement 
stages of their life course. 
Negatively-geared investors have an average tax assessable income, or income before 
deductions, of $91,000. After deductions are taken into account, the remaining average taxable 
income for negatively-geared investors is $80,000 on average. On the other hand, positively-
geared investors have lower tax assessable incomes of $78,500 on average, and this only 
reduces slightly to $77,500 of taxable income after deductions.  
Both types of investors have similar residential rental property values of around $300,000 on 
average. However, the differences in their net rental income reflect their different gearing status, 
with negatively-geared investors making a loss of around $8,800 on average while positively-
geared investors make a profit of around $16,000 on average. 
Table 3: Characteristics of rental investors, by geared status, 2013–14, per cent by 
column unless specified otherwise 
Characteristics   
Negatively 
geared 
Positively 
geared 
All 
Sample   1,798 994 2,792 
Population (‘000)   1,158,264 650,485 1,808,749 
Sex 
Male 54.2% 49.1% 53.0% 
Female 45.8% 50.9% 47.0% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Age (years) 
Mean 46 55 49 
Median 47 56 47 
Labour force status 
Full-time 68.3% 40.3% 58.2% 
Part-time 17.8% 20.3% 18.7% 
Unemployed 2.1% 1.9% 2.0% 
NILF 11.9% 37.5% 21.1% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Tax assessable income 
($/year) 
Mean $91,105 $78,534 $86,584 
Median $67,600 $51,653 $62,354 
Taxable income ($/year)  
Mean $80,370 $77,490 $79,334 
Median $58,747 $51,336 $55,228 
Mean $302,893 $328,229 $312,004 
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Characteristics   
Negatively 
geared 
Positively 
geared 
All 
Residential rental property 
value ($) 
Median $233,333 $250,000 $250,000 
Net rental income ($/year) 
Mean -$8,780 $15,990 $128 
Median -$5,487 $5,980 -$1,946 
Notes: Estimates are population weighted on a person basis. For couples, the residential rental property value is 
divided equally between the partners in the couple. 
Source: Authors’ own calculations from the 2013–14 SIH 
3.2.2 Rental investment histories of negatively-geared versus positively-geared 
investors: an investigation into investor-churners 
Figure 4 below exploits the longitudinal feature of the HILDA Survey to track rental investment 
spells reported in the HILDA Survey from the first year of spell of rental investment, through to 
the end of the data collection period in wave 13. We distinguish between two subsets of rental 
investors—those who were negatively geared throughout their rental investment spell, and 
those who were positively geared throughout their rental investment spell. We define the 
beginning of time as the first wave during which a person is recorded as earning rental income, 
and label it year 0; interest focuses on whether, and when, the spell of rental investment ends. 
Time is measured in intervals of one year. The unit of analysis is spells, so if a rental investor 
has three separate rental investment spells during the data timeframe, the rental investor 
appears three times in the data set.  
The hazard rate is the key measure of the ‘risk’ of ending a rental investment spell in each time 
period. It is the conditional probability that a landlord will realise his/her rental investment given 
that (s)he did not realise the rental investment in previous time periods. For example, in year 2, 
the hazard rate is 0.35 for both negatively and positively-geared spells, indicating that 35 per 
cent of the rental investment spells that constituted the risk set at the beginning of Year 2 ended 
during year 2. The hazard rate for positively-geared rental investment spells demonstrate a form 
of negative duration dependence—the longer the spell, the lower the likelihood of it ending. For 
negatively-geared rental investment spells, the hazard rate also demonstrates negative duration 
dependence up to year 4, but jumps around quite a bit after that, and is noticeably higher than 
positively-geared spells during years 5 and 6. Estimates after year 6 are excluded for 
negatively-geared investors due to small sample sizes. 
The survival rate is a measure of the probability that a randomly selected rental investment spell 
will ‘survive’ into year t, given that it was not realised in the time periods preceding year t. The 
survival rate trends parallel the hazard rate trends. While both positively and negatively-geared 
spells exhibit a decline in survival rate over the first few years of the spell, negatively-geared 
spells do appear to have slightly lower survival rates from year 5.  
This provides tentative evidence that negatively-geared investors are more likely to terminate 
rental leases as market conditions change.5 Negatively-geared investors make operating losses 
and hence their rental investment decisions are more sensitive to changes in economic 
conditions than positively-geared investors. On the one hand, this may have adverse impacts 
on the tenure security of tenants. On the other hand, there are potential efficiency gains from 
                                               
 
5 Using a shorter data timeframe (the 2001–06 HILDA Survey), Wood and Ong (2010) found similar evidence of 
earlier exits from the rental market by negatively-geared landlords than positively-geared landlords. 
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landlords having the flexibility to adjust supply in the rental market in response to changes in 
housing market conditions (Wood and Ong 2010). 
Figure 4: Hazard and survival rates of rental investment spells over the period 2001–13, 
by rental investors’ gearing status throughout spell 
(a) Hazard rate 
(b) Survival rate 
Notes: Estimates are population weighted on a person basis. The number of negatively-geared cases remaining 
in the sample dips to below 10 by year 7. Hence, estimates beyond year 6 are excluded due to a lack of statistical 
reliability. 
Source: Authors’ own calculations from the 2001 to 2013 HILDA Survey. 
Table 4 below investigates whether those who start out as negatively-geared investors in the 
new millennium end up churning through multiple rental investment spells more than those who 
start out as positively geared. It would appear that those who begin as positively-geared 
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investors are slightly less prone to churning than those who begin as negatively-geared 
investors. However, the differences are slight. 
Table 4: Number of rental investors with single and multiple rental investment spells 
during 2001–13, by gearing status when first observed as a rental investor during the 
timeframe, number and per cent 
Number of 
spells Negatively geared Positively geared 
 
N Per cent N Per cent 
1 978,474 72.8% 1,230,028 73.9% 
2 282,472 21.0% 335,198 20.1% 
3 52,974 3.9% 67,989 4.1% 
4 27,866 2.1% 30,891 1.9% 
5 1,890 0.1% - 0.0% 
All 1,343,676 100.0% 1,664,106 100.0% 
Notes: Estimates are population weighted on a person basis. 
Source: Authors’ own calculations from the 2001 to 2013 HILDA Survey. 
However, there appear to be some distinctions by location. Table 5 below focuses on rental 
investors who churn only. The table shows that nearly 23 per cent of investor-churners are 
located in Melbourne, followed by 17 per cent in Sydney. Among churners, those who are 
negatively geared are over-represented in all major cities, with the exception of Adelaide, a 
relatively slow-growth housing market. In major regional areas, where house price growth is 
slower, positively-geared investors with multiple spells are over-represented. 
Table 5: Distribution of rental investor-churners across locations, by gearing status when 
first observed as a rental investor during the timeframe, per cent 
 
Negatively geared Positively geared All 
Major cities    
Sydney 19.7% 14.8% 17.0% 
Melbourne 24.0% 21.7% 22.8% 
Brisbane 8.3% 6.6% 7.4% 
Adelaide 1.5% 4.3% 3.0% 
Perth 11.1% 8.4% 9.6% 
Major regional areas    
Rest of NSW 8.5% 10.7% 9.7% 
Rest of Victoria 7.4% 8.5% 8.0% 
Rest of Queensland 10.8% 11.4% 11.1% 
Rest of SA 0.8% 1.6% 1.2% 
Rest of WA 2.5% 6.2% 4.5% 
Other    
Tasmania 1.1% 3.0% 2.2% 
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Negatively geared Positively geared All 
NT 1.9% 0.4% 1.1% 
ACT 2.5% 2.2% 2.4% 
All 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Notes: Estimates are population weighted on a person basis. 
Source: Authors’ own calculations from the 2001 to 2013 HILDA Survey. 
3.2.3 Negatively-geared investors across tax savings quintiles 
In Table 6 below, we investigate which groups among negatively-geared investors have 
benefited most from negative gearing provisions. Negatively-geared investors are ranked 
according to the amount of tax savings received due to negative gearing provisions. These 
investors are then divided equally into five groups or quintiles, with the lowest (highest) quintile 
representing those receiving the least (greatest) amount of tax savings from negative gearing 
provisions. Hence, each quintile contains around 20 per cent of negatively-geared investors.  
Table 6 shows that the tax savings can range from under $82 in the lowest tax savings quintile 
to over $3,535 in the highest quintile. The distributional analysis across tax savings quintiles 
enables identification of the characteristics of those who are over-represented in the highest tax 
savings quintile as opposed to lower quintiles. Those socio-economic groups that are over-
represented (>20%) in high tax savings quintiles benefit the most from negative gearing 
provisions while those who are over-represented (<20%) in the low tax savings quintiles benefit 
the least from the provisions. 
The table shows that negatively-geared investors who are over-represented in high tax savings 
quintiles and therefore benefit the most are middle-aged males aged 35–54 years old who are 
full-time employees. On the other hand, the ones who benefit the least are females and older 
negatively-geared investors aged 55+ years who are not in the labour force.  
The biggest beneficiaries from negative gearing provisions are those on relatively high tax 
assessable incomes, who own relatively high value properties, and who report the largest net 
rental losses. Indeed, those in the highest tax savings quintile have mean tax assessable 
income levels of over $100,000, over ten times the income of those in the lowest tax savings 
quintile. Those in the highest tax savings quintile also have property values that are 25 per cent 
on average higher than those in the lowest quintile, and the former report over $20,000 in 
annual net rental losses which is nearly three times the value of net rental losses reported by 
those in the lowest tax savings quintile.  
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Table 6: Mean tax savings benefits due to negative gearing, by tax savings quintile, 
2013–14 
Characteristics    Tax savings quintile 
   
Lowest 
($0 to 
$81) 
Second 
($81 to 
$828) 
Third 
($828 to 
$1,757) 
Fourth 
($1,757 to 
$3,495) 
Highest 
($3,495 to 
$40,913) 
Sex (% by row) 
Male 16.3% 17.4% 21.7% 18.9% 25.7% 
Female 23.6% 23.1% 15.0% 19.1% 19.2% 
Age band (% by 
row) 
<35 years 17.5% 20.7% 19.3% 23.0% 19.5% 
35–54 years 15.6% 21.5% 18.7% 19.6% 24.6% 
55+ years 30.6% 16.3% 17.9% 15.2% 20.2% 
Labour force 
status (% by row) 
Full-time 8.6% 20.4% 19.6% 22.9% 28.5% 
Part-time 29.1% 23.6% 19.8% 14.9% 12.7% 
Unemployed 45.8% 39.0% 6.5% 0.9% 7.8% 
NILF 64.4% 9.5% 13.4% 6.0% 6.6% 
Tax assessable 
income ($/year) 
Mean $12,883 $97,210 $104,844 $100,050 $137,501 
Median $5,203 $60,372 $75,084 $83,547 $102,076 
Taxable income 
($/year)  
Mean $22,019 $95,682 $99,602 $91,798 $114,355 
Median $11,977 $60,321 $72,240 $75,278 $81,626 
Residential rental 
property value ($) 
Mean $294,888 $278,425 $287,757 $281,034 $362,187 
Median $240,000 $210,000 $215,000 $225,000 $290,000 
Net rental income 
($/year) 
Mean -$7,378 -$1,938 -$4,449 -$7,660 -$20,530 
Median -$4,032 -$1,278 -$3,580 -$6,982 -$16,070 
Notes: Estimates are population weighted on a person basis. For couples, the residential rental property value is 
divided equally between the partners in the couple. 
Source: Authors’ own calculations from the 2013–14 SIH. 
3.3 Capital gains tax discount  
In this section, we shed light on the typical characteristics of housing market participants who 
benefit differently from CGT provisions. Home owners enjoy 100 per cent CGT discount, rental 
investors 50 per cent CGT discount, renters no CGT discount. Hence, there are potentially four 
tenure subgroups who are influenced to different extents by the CGT discount.  
First, those who do not own rental investment properties ('home owners only' and 'renters only' 
in Table 7 below) make up the two largest groups. Home owners only receive the 100 per cent 
CGT discount that applies to the family home. Renters who do not own rental investment 
properties receive no CGT discount at all as they do not own properties that make capital gains.  
Home-owner investors own both a family home and at least one rental investment property. 
While they are much smaller in number than either home owners only or renters only, they 
benefit the most from CGT discount provisions as they enjoy a 100 per cent CGT discount on 
the family home and a further 50 per cent discount on rental investment properties. 
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Finally, a small but not insignificant group of just under 400,000 renter-investors exists. These 
do not live in a home that they own, but they are renting out properties that attract a 50 per cent 
CGT discount. 
Table 7: Housing market participants who benefit differently from CGT, 2013–14, per cent 
by total 
 Tax savings Sample Population Per cent 
Home-
ownerinvestors  
100% CGT discount on owner 
occupied property, 50% CGT 
discount on rental property 
2,244 1,409,079 7.4% 
Home owners only 100% CGT discount 13,747 8,767,436 45.8% 
Renter-investors  50% CGT discount on rental 
property 
548 399,670 2.1% 
Renters only No tax savings 10,726 8,574,668 44.8% 
All  27,265 19,150,853 100.0% 
Source: Authors’ own calculations from the 2013–14 SIH. 
Table 8 below compares the characteristics of the four subgroups listed in the previous table. 
The comparison aims to shed light on the characteristics of each of these groups to detect 
systematic differences between groups that benefit differently from CGT discount provisions, 
ranging from home-owner investors who benefit from CGT discounts on multiple properties to 
renters only who receive no CCT discounts. 
The table shows clearly that those who rent (renter-investors and renters only) tend to be 
younger than those who own a family home, potentially reflecting life course related housing 
tenure pathways. The median renter only is aged 32 years, followed by renter-investors who are 
aged 42 years, and finally those who have a family home who are typically in their early fifties. 
There is also a sharp distinction in labour force status across the four subgroups. Those who 
own investment properties are more likely to be employed full-time and therefore have higher 
tax assessable incomes. Those who do not own investment properties are over-represented 
among the NILF group.  
An obvious pattern that emerges is that CGT discount benefits are heavily weighted towards 
those who are more affluent. This skew is obvious when we compare the incomes and property 
assets of the four subgroups. Home-owner investors who own both a family home and at least 
one rental investment property have the highest average income of $82,000. On the other hand, 
renters who do not own any properties have the lowest average income of $31,000, less than 
half of home-owner investors’ mean income.  
On average, a home-owner investor can own a property portfolio worth over $730,000 
($420,000 average primary home value plus $310,000 average rental investment property 
value). Those who own a family home but not rental properties, and those who own rental 
properties but not a family home, typically have property wealth sitting at around $340,000. On 
the other hand, renters who do not own any properties have no property wealth. 
Hence, the benefits of CGT discounts are clearly greater the greater the number of properties 
and the higher one’s income level.  
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Table 8: Characteristics of housing market participants who benefit differently from CGT 
provisions, 2013–14, per cent by column unless specified otherwise 
Characteristics   
Home owner-
investors 
Home 
owners 
only 
Renter-
investors 
Renters 
only 
CGT discount type   
100% on family 
home and 50% 
on rental 
properties 
100% on 
family home 
50% on rental 
properties 
No discount 
Sex 
Male 51.5% 46.7% 58.4% 50.6% 
Female 48.5% 53.3% 41.6% 49.5% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Age (years) 
Mean 51 54 43 35 
Median 52 52 42 32 
Labour force status 
Full-time 54.5% 38.8% 59.6% 33.5% 
Part-time 21.4% 19.9% 20.9% 23.3% 
Unemployed 1.7% 2.7% 3.0% 9.3% 
NILF 22.4% 38.7% 16.5% 34.0% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Taxable income 
($/year) 
Mean $81,596 $49,463 $71,362 $30,844 
Median $56,203 $31,573 $52,572 $19,916 
Primary home value 
($) 
Mean $417,904 $340,536 N/A N/A 
Median $335,000 $275,000 N/A N/A 
Residential Rental 
property value ($) 
Mean $308,534 N/A $324,240 N/A 
Median $240,000 N/A $250,000 N/A 
Notes: Estimates are population weighted on a person basis. 
Source: Authors’ own calculations from the 2013–14 SIH. 
3.4 Policy development implications  
The key findings from this chapter have primary policy development implications.  
First, negative gearing and CGT discount benefits are heavily skewed towards those who are 
more affluent, raising issues around the extent to which such policies exacerbate income and 
wealth inequality among the Australian population. Negatively-geared rental investors making a 
loss of around $8,800 on average while positively-geared investors make a profit of around 
$16,000 on average. However, negatively-geared investors have noticeably higher tax 
assessable incomes than positively-geared investors. The former reported an average tax 
assessable income of $91,000 in the 2013–14 SIH compared to $78,500 among positively-
geared investors. Among negatively-geared investors, those who receive the greatest tax 
savings are also those who have the highest incomes and rental property values, and greatest 
annual net rental losses. Similarly, CGT discount benefits are heavily weighted towards those 
who are more affluent in terms of both income and property wealth. On average, a home-owner 
investor can own a property portfolio worth over $730,000. Home-owner investors’ average tax 
assessable income is $82,000 compared to $31,000 among renters who do not own any 
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properties. Hence, any reforms to negative gearing or CGT ought to ensure that it reduces 
inequities inherent within the current systems by reducing tax savings by proportionately greater 
amounts for those who have relatively high income or asset levels. 
A second but tentative policy implication derives from the longitudinal analysis of rental 
investment spells in the HILDA Survey. It would appear that negatively-geared investors may be 
more likely to terminate rental leases as market conditions change. Negatively-geared investors 
make operating losses and hence their rental investment decisions are more sensitive to 
changes in economic conditions than positively-geared investors, so this finding is not 
surprising. However, the policy implications are mixed. On the one hand, this may have adverse 
impacts on the tenure security of tenants and indeed overall housing market stability. On the 
other hand, as suggested by Wood and Ong (2010), there are potential efficiency gains from 
landlords having the flexibility to adjust supply in the rental market in response to changes in 
housing market conditions. 
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4 Negative gearing and capital gains tax: impacts of 
proposed reforms and transitional arrangements  
 If the key policy concern is that a tightening of negative gearing parameters will 
impact ‘mum and dad’ investors’ economic wellbeing negatively and result in a 
behavioural decision by such investors to withdraw from the rental housing 
market, then it is likely that a progressive rental deduction that cushions ‘mum 
and dad’ investors from significant drops in tax savings will be a more 
appropriate policy option than a more blunt cap on rental deductions.  
 A progressive rental deduction that distinguishes between ‘mum and dad’ and 
‘sophisticated’ investors has the potential to reduce inequities inherent in the 
current systems by reducing tax savings by proportionately greater amounts for 
those who have relatively high income or property asset levels than general 
rental deduction caps.  
 However, it is noteworthy that progressive rental deduction reforms are likely to 
be administratively more complex to implement than a cap. Moreover, the 
progressive nature of the reform may blunt incentives to work by investors. 
 A reduction in CGT discount will narrow the gap in after-tax economic cost 
burdens that lower income and higher income rental investors have to bear, 
reducing inequities within the current system that favour higher income earners 
compared to lower income earners.  
 A gradual reduction in the discount would ‘soften’ the impact of the CGT reform 
by providing a transition pathway that raises the after-tax economic cost of 
holding rental investment housing incrementally. 
This chapter addresses the report’s third and fourth research questions: 
What are the revenue and distributional impacts of different negative gearing and CGT reform 
scenarios on housing investors and the Federal budget?  
What potential transitional arrangements might minimise the revenue and distributional 
pressures during the process of reform?  
We begin by providing a summary of proposed reforms and transitional arrangements relating 
to negative gearing and CGT in the existing literature in section 4.1, and what the current 
findings are in relation to the impacts of these proposed changes. We follow this by reporting 
results from a series of policy simulations designed to test for the impacts of alternative variants 
of reforms to negative gearing and CGT discounts on landlords’ after-tax incomes, and where 
possible, budgetary savings that might be derived from the reforms. We focus on negative 
gearing reforms in section 4.2 and CGT discounts in section 4.3.  
4.1 Existing research on this chapter’s theme 
Proposals to reform the taxation of investment housing are generally based on addressing the 
asymmetry between negative gearing and capital gains. In order to limit adverse effects on the 
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housing market, which is vulnerable to shocks arising from changes in policy, most proposals 
advocate that changes be phased in over time.  
Recommendation 13 of the Senate inquiry into housing affordability (Economics References 
Committee 2015) identified the following options for reform: 
 a housing specific quarantining measure that limits deductibility of expenses from housing to 
income from housing 
 a broader investment quarantining measure that limits deductions in relation to investment 
income to the amount of income received 
 a targeted approach that allows negative gearing in respect of new or affordable housing 
 restricting negative gearing to a specified number of properties 
 applying the recommendations in the Henry Review to allow a 40 per cent discount to 
income and expenses in relation to investment properties 
 reducing or removing the CGT discount. 
A number of OECD jurisdictions limit the deductibility of rental losses against either income from 
rents or more broadly income from investment (see Table 1).  
In the context of losses from specific activities, there are examples in the existing Australian 
taxation law where the losses from particular activities are not taken into account against 
income from other sources. This practice, referred to as 'quarantining' of losses is required in 
respect of the losses of certain small businesses. A number of measures in relation to the 
taxation of foreign source income also aggregate and quarantine income from specific sources 
to calculate the rate of Australian tax, or available credits, in respect of that income. 
During the period from 1985–87 there was a statutory restriction on the tax deductibility of 
interest. The Hawke/Keating Government introduced legislation to limit the tax deductibility of 
interest on borrowing used to acquire property after July 1985 to the net rental income 
remaining after deducting all non-interest expenses other than the building capital write-off. 
These provisions, which only applied to new loans and only to loans for rental properties, 
predated the introduction of the capital gains tax by about two months. 
The quarantining provisions were repealed in the 1987 budget following a sustained campaign 
against the restriction. At the time of the repeal, Keating referred to the introduction of the 
Capital Gains Tax as an alternative way to address the tax shelter (Cabinet Office 1987). 
As noted by the Senate Economics Committee, the effect of quarantining negative gearing 
remains one of the most contentious areas of tax policy (Economics Reference Committee 
2015, paragraph 9.65)  
Evans, Minas et al. (2015) discussed the replacement of the CGT discount with an annual CGT 
exemption cap. It is argued that this reform would impose capital gains tax on larger gains, 
which would improve the equity and efficiency of the CGT.  
Grudnoff (2015) proposed the removal of the CGT discount combined with changes to negative 
gearing to allow deductions for up to ten years after construction of new housing. Existing 
properties would be grandfathered for five years only.  
In the 2016 Federal Election campaign reforms to negative gearing were proposed by the 
Australian Labor Party (ALP 2016) and the Australian Greens (2016).  
The ALP proposal would limit negative gearing to properties acquired before 1 July 2017 and 
newly constructed properties after that date, coupled with changes to the CGT discount to 
reduce the discount to 25 per cent for assets acquired after 1 July 2017 (ALP 2016).  
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The Parliamentary Budget Office (PBO) modelled the cost of this proposal as saving $1,929m 
over the 2016–17 forward estimates period; although it noted that the savings would increase 
after the end of that period (PBO 2016: Table B-1, ALP 015).  
Phillips (2016) modelled the impact of the ALP proposals to remove negative gearing for 
properties (that are not newly constructed) acquired from 1 July 2017 and reduced the 
magnitude of the CGT discount to 25 per cent.  
Phillips (2016) finds that the benefits of negative gearing are highly skewed towards the top 
decile of family income, estimating that in the 2017–18 year the cost to the revenue from 
negatively geared properties is $4.3 million. Specifically, the distributional analysis shows that 
21.7 per cent of the population of negatively-geared investors are in the top decile of family 
income, and this decile’s share of the tax savings is 35.2 per cent. For each of the other nine 
deciles the share of the tax saving is less than the proportion of negatively gearing investors in 
the respective decile. For example, the second highest (9th) decile includes 17.5 per cent of 
negatively-geared investors and their share of the overall savings from negative gearing is 
17.4 per cent, and the fifth decile consists of 7.5 per cent of investors who receive 5.6 per cent 
of the tax savings.  
The Greens proposal would have removed negative gearing from all new investments, including 
residential real estate, from 1 July 2017, and reduced the CGT discount by 10 per cent per 
annum over the next five years until it is phased out. This proposal was submitted to the PBO 
too late to be formally costed during the election period, but in the post-election report the PBO 
estimated that the proposal would have saved $14,426 million over the 2016–17 forward 
estimates period. The proposal would have higher savings after the end of the forward 
estimates period (PBO 2016: Table C-1, GRN 094). The Greens policy has since been further 
refined to immediately remove negative gearing from all investors with more than one 
investment property (Di Natale 2017).  
The model proposed in the Henry Review to include 40 per cent of income and allow 
40 per cent of expenses was modelled by Wood, Ong et al. (2011). This report found that 
negatively-geared investors would be adversely affected by the change that could lead to their 
exit from the investment housing market. However, the market effect would be offset by the 
incentive for equity investors to retain their investment properties. 
A further proposal to limit negative gearing is the introduction of a global cap on all deductions 
that a taxpayer can claim (Warren 2014). Tran-Nam and Evans noted that the introduction of 
standard deductions in the context of work-related deductions may have perverse outcomes by 
encouraging taxpayers to claim up to the cap regardless of actual expenditure (Tran-Nam and 
Evans 2012). A similar cap has been introduced in the UK to limit tax reliefs to the greater of 
£50,000 or 25 per cent of income. However, this cap does not apply to interest on rental 
properties as from 6 April 2017 relief on mortgage interest costs is separately limited to the base 
rate of tax (HMRC 2017).  
There is no consensus in public debate over which taxpayers are most likely to access negative 
gearing concessions. Government spokespersons say that most negatively-geared investors 
earn a taxable income of less than $80,000 per annum, and have only one property (O’Dwyer 
2015; Morrison 2016). However, this claim has been criticised on the basis that the data is 
based on taxable income, after deductions related to rental properties; and that only 20 per cent 
of taxpayers have taxable incomes over $80,000 (Daly and Wood 2016; Phillips and Joseph 
2015).  
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4.2 Negative gearing 
4.2.1 Reform simulations 
In this section, we present the results from a range of negative gearing reform simulations, 
drawing on the reforms proposed in the existing literature in the previous section. The impacts 
of all proposed reforms are compared against the actual scenario, where rental expenses 
receive a 100 per cent deduction against both rental and non-rental taxable income sources.  
As highlighted in Chapter 3, negative gearing and CGT discount benefits are heavily skewed 
towards those who are more affluent, potentially exacerbating income and wealth inequality 
among the Australian population. As such, a complete abolition of negative gearing and CGT 
discount benefits has the potential to achieve a desirable reduction in income and wealth 
inequality. Moreover, the abolition of negative gearing has the potential to ease competition for 
housing in the market between first home buyers and investors, and hence reduce crowding out 
of first home buyers from the market.  
However, policy commentators have long raised concerns around potentially undesirable effects 
of such reforms. Indeed, a complete abolition of negative gearing reforms has often been 
criticised by policy-makers for its potentially adverse impacts on the financial wellbeing of ‘mum 
and dad’ investors. Concerns have also been raised regarding a potential ‘flight’ of investors 
from the rental market should negative gearing and CGT benefits be abolished, resulting in a 
shortage of rental housing supply which in turn adversely affects rental affordability.  
Overall, a complete abolition of negative gearing and CGT discount benefits are typically viewed 
as being politically unpopular. Hence, in this section we explicitly model transitional 
arrangements that are designed to moderate the impacts of a reduction in negative gearing and 
CGT benefits through policy reform. We draw primarily on the EVITA microsimulation model 
operationalised on SIH data on negatively-geared investors that have been adjusted via the 
redistribution of net rental losses described in Chapter 3. The following are the simulations that 
are modelled and reported in this chapter.6  
Progressive rental deduction  
As mentioned above, a complete abolition of negative gearing reforms has often been criticised 
by policy-makers for its potentially adverse impacts on the financial wellbeing of ‘mum and dad’ 
investors. Indeed, as mentioned in section 4.1, a key recommendation in the 2015 Senate 
inquiry into housing affordability was to restrict negative gearing benefits to a limited number of 
properties (Economics References Committee 2015). It is suggested that this approach might 
better target rental investors looking to diversify their retirement savings while limiting large 
deductions being claimed against high-value property portfolios (AHL Investments Pty Ltd 
2014). This approach has an added benefit of potentially performing the role of a transitional 
measure that can potentially act as a stepping stone to a complete abolition of negative gearing 
in the future. 
In our first set of simulations, we distinguish between ‘mum and dad’ and ‘sophisticated’ 
investors7 and apply more generous concessions to the former. We differentiate between these 
investor groups in two different ways:  
                                               
 
6 A full behavioural examination of alternative negative gearing options is beyond the scope of this report, for the 
reasons discussed earlier. Nevertheless, the recalibration in EVITA of net rental losses between SIH and ATO 
makes possible some unique analysis of distributional impacts, transitional arrangements and policy costing of 
alternative negative gearing reform options. 
7 Note that the term 'sophisticated investor' is used to describe an investor with multiple rental properties. It does 
not infer that the investor would meet the criteria of s.708 of the Corporations Act 2001 to be described as a 
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 Income-based: First, we differentiate low, middle and high-income rental investors. The 
assumption here is that ‘mum and dad’ investors are more likely to have low to moderate 
incomes, while sophisticated investors are more likely to be concentrated in higher income 
ranges. We simulate a reform whereby rental investors in the bottom 50 per cent of the 
income distribution continues to receive a 100 per cent rental deduction, those in the 51st–
75th percentiles receive a lower 50 per cent rental deduction, and those in the 76th–100th 
percentiles receive zero rental deductions, with this upper quartile representing 
‘sophisticated’ investors.  
 Property-based: Second, we differentiate between ‘mum and dad’ and ‘sophisticated’ 
investors based on a number of properties criteria. We assume that ‘mum and dad’ investors 
are more likely to own one rental property while sophisticated investors are more likely to 
own multiple properties. We simulate a reform whereby rental investors in the bottom 
50 per cent of the rental property value distribution continues to receive a 100 per cent rental 
deduction, those in the 51st–75th percentiles receive a lower 50 per cent rental deduction, 
and those in the 76th–100th percentiles receive zero rental deductions, with this upper 
quartile again representing ‘sophisticated’ investors. 
Rental deduction cap 
A popularly mooted form of negative gearing is the quarantining of negative gearing in some 
form. The previous section provides more details, but it is obvious that these have been 
proposed in Australia more than once historically—including recommendations by the 2015 
Senate inquiry into housing affordability which were not implemented (Economics References 
Committee 2015) and the quarantining legislation implemented in 1985, though it was short-
lived and repealed after just two years. We model a transitional arrangement towards a 
complete quarantining of negative gearing by applying rental deduction caps at progressively 
stringent levels. One of Warren’s (2014) modelling exercises for the UK sets deductions at a 
cap of £25,000, then £50,000, followed by £50,000 increments in cap levels to £200,000. 
Another exercise models the tax relief achieved at the greater of £50,000 or 25 per cent of 
income. Here, we follow a similar approach by modelling the following caps on rental 
deductions, comprising a stepped transition from more generous to less generous deduction 
limits for negatively-geared investors: 
 $40,000 cap 
 $30,000 cap 
 $20,000 cap (equivalent to around 25 per cent of tax assessable income) 
 $10,000 cap 
 $5,000 cap. 
Note a $0 cap would result in a full quarantining of negative gearing. 
4.2.2 Distributional impacts 
Table 9 below presents results from simulations of progressive rental deductions based on both 
income-based and property-based percentiles, with ‘mum and dad’ investors represented in the 
lower to moderate income ranges and ‘sophisticated’ investors represented in the upper 
quartiles. ‘Mum and dad’ investors in the bottom half of the income distribution receive mean tax 
savings of $742. The mean tax savings received by investors rise as one progresses up the 
income distribution scale. At the upper income quartile, ‘sophisticated’ investors receive an 
                                               
 
sophisticated investor. It also refers to individual investors and so the definition excludes institutional investment 
in rental housing. 
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average of $3,149 in tax savings, over four times the savings received by investors in the 
bottom half of the income distribution. When the distribution is measured on a property value 
basis, the trend is the same, though the increase in mean tax savings is less steep as one 
moves up the property value distribution, from $1,336 to $2,156.  
Under the proposed reforms, ‘mum and dad’ investors in the bottom half of the income and 
property value distributions are excluded from any reduction in rental deductions and therefore 
experience no reduction in tax savings. At the other extreme, those in the upper quartile are 
subject to a full quarantine of negative gearing and therefore receive zero rental deductions, 
resulting in a complete loss of their tax savings from negative gearing. 
Those in the 50th to 75th percentiles receive a 50 per cent rental deduction, a less severe 
measure than zero rental deductions. ‘Mum and dad’ investors in this group lose around half of 
their rental deductions. They are therefore cushioned from a complete loss of their rental 
deductions, and less likely to exit the rental market than if they were subject to a full 
quarantining of negative gearing. Such a measure is therefore also a potential transitional 
arrangement that could ease the pathway towards a complete negative gearing quarantine for 
all rental investors over time. 
Table 9: Mean tax savings of progressive rental deduction reforms on negatively-geared 
investors, 2013–14 
 Percentile 
 
Income-based criteria Property-based criteria 
 <=50% 50th–75th 76th–100th <=50% 50th–75th 76th–100th 
Actual: 
Mean tax savings (annual $) $742 $2,362 $3,149 $1,336 $1,567 $2,156 
Reform: 
Mean tax savings (annual $) $742 $1,203 $0 $1,336 $752 $0 
Mean reduction in tax savings       
 Annual $ $0 $1,159 $3,149 $0 $815 $2,156 
 Per cent 0.0% -49.1% -100.0% 0.0% -52.0% -100.0% 
Notes: Estimates are population weighted on a person basis. 
Source: Authors’ own calculations from the 2013 SIH. 
Figure 5 below charts the average rental deductions profile of negatively-geared investors 
across the tax assessable income distribution under the actual and two progressive rental 
deductions scenarios. In general, the amount of rental deductions (expressed as a percentage 
of income) decline as income increases. However, it is clear that under the income-based 
progressive rental deduction scenario, the level of average rental deductions will decline more 
steeply than under the actual setting, with rental deductions hitting zero beyond the 75th income 
percentile. Hence, the income-based reform will result in a harder ‘hit’ to higher income 
investors than lower income investors. The property-based reform results in a general lowering 
of rental deductions across all income levels, but still maintains a decline in rental deductions as 
income rises. Of course, while not shown here, the rental deductions under the property-based 
reform would decline steeply as the rental property value rises, hitting zero beyond the 75th 
property value percentile. 
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 Figure 5: Distributional impacts of progressive rental deduction reforms, 2013–14 
Notes: Estimates are population weighted on a person basis. 
Source: Authors’ own calculations from the 2013 SIH. 
Table 10 below presents the results of another set of simulations that centre around the 
application of caps or limits on the amount of rental deductions that individual rental investors 
are permitted to receive. The table presents an array of results that reflect a potential transition 
from a generous cap of $40,000 to increasingly restrictive cap levels. The average tax savings 
that rental investors receive from negative gearing is $1,615. This reduces only very slightly by 
$25 under a generous $40,000 cap. If the cap is halved to $20,000, an average of $244 in tax 
savings resulting in a 15 per cent reduction in tax savings to $1,371. This declines steeply to 
just $694, a decline of over 50 per cent, if the cap is further reduced to $5,000. 
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Table 10: Mean tax savings of rental deduction caps, 2013–14 
 All Rental deduction cap 
  $40,000 $30,000 $20,000 $10,000 $5,000 
Actual:  
Mean tax savings (annual $) $1,615 $1,590 $1,526 $1,371 $1,053 $694 
Reform:  
Mean tax savings reduction             
 Annual $ N/A $25 $89 $244 $562 $921 
 Per cent N/A 1.5% 5.5% 15.1% 34.8% 57.0% 
Notes: Estimates are population weighted on a person basis. 
Source: Authors’ own calculations from the 2013 SIH. 
Figure 6 below profiles the average rental deductions across tax assessable income ranges 
under incrementally stricter cap levels. Regardless of cap level, the amount of rental deductions 
decline as a percentage of tax assessable income as income rises. As expected, a generous 
global cap of $40,000 would result in little deviation from the actual setting. Reducing the cap 
levels will result in increasingly lower levels of rental deductions across the income distribution. 
Figure 6: Distributional impacts of rental deduction cap reforms, 2013–14 
Notes: Estimates are population weighted on a person basis. 
Source: Authors’ own calculations from the 2013 SIH. 
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4.2.3 Revenue impacts 
The estimated budgetary cost of negative gearing generated from EVITA operationalised on the 
2013–14 SIH (after the redistribution exercise) is $3.04 billion. The reform simulations 
conducted above yield aggregate revenue impacts, which are derived from the SIH data by 
applying population weights to each negatively-geared investor in the data set and aggregating 
the reduction in tax savings experienced by each individual under each reform. The sum of the 
tax savings reduction under each reform is the overall reduction in budgetary cost yielded by the 
reform. This is comparable with negative gearing costs from other publications that draw from 
ATO data. For instance, Grudnoff (2015) reported an estimated cost of negative gearing of 
$3.7 billion. The Greens Western Australia (2016) estimated the cost of negative gearing to be 
$4 billion, and Eslake’s (2013) submission to the senate inquiry into housing affordability 
suggest a higher cost of $5 billion, though it assumes that all landlords are in a 38 per cent 
income tax bracket.  
Each negative gearing reform simulated in this report will reduce the amount of tax savings that 
investors can derive from negative gearing. Hence, each will give rise to cost savings for the 
Federal Government. Table 11 below documents the impact of each negative gearing reform on 
government budgets. These range widely depending on the severity of the reform.  
Progressive rental deductions on income (property) based criteria will reduce the budgetary cost 
of negative gearing by $1.74 billion ($1.47 billion) or 57 per cent (48%), as tax savings benefits 
are tightened for more sophisticated rental investor subgroups.  
The budgetary cost of each rental deduction cap reform rises as the cap level rises as the 
number of individuals whose tax assessable incomes are affected by the reform is reduced. 
Hence, the reduction in budgetary cost narrows from over half for a $5,000 cap to one-third for a 
$10,000 cap, to under 2 per cent for a $40,000 cap. Broadly similar conclusions are drawn by 
Daley and Wood’s (2016) modelling of the same reform. They find a $5,000 cap in 2015–16 
would have the impact of reducing the budgetary cost of negative gearing by $1.3 billion as 
compared to $1.74 billion for 2013–14 in this report. Similarly, they find that a $20,000 cap 
would reduce budgetary costs by $0.3 billion compared to $0.46 billion in this report. 
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Table 11: Revenue impacts of negative gearing reforms, 2013–14 
  Budgetary 
cost 
Mean reduction in 
budgetary cost 
  billion $ billion $ % 
Actual   3.04   
Progressive rental deduction Income-based 1.30 1.74 57.3% 
 Property-based 1.57 1.47 48.3% 
Rental deduction cap $40,000 2.99 0.05 1.6% 
 $30,000 2.87 0.17 5.5% 
 $20,000 2.57 0.46 15.3% 
 $10,000 1.98 1.06 34.8% 
 $5,000 1.30 1.73 57.0% 
Notes: Estimates are population weighted on a person basis. 
Source: Authors’ own calculations from the 2013 SIH. 
4.3 Capital gains tax discount 
4.3.1 Impacts on net income 
In this section, we model the likely impacts of a transitional CGT reform on the net income of a 
typical rental investor using EVITA operationalised on the 2013–14 SIH. Due to the cross-
sectional nature of the SIH, it is not possible to observe the capital gain of properties that when 
sold would in turn attract a CGT discount. Moreover, the SIH does not record information on 
property sales transactions.  
While there are more limitations to what we can do in CGT simulations than negative gearing 
simulations due to data restrictions, we can nevertheless conduct analysis of the impacts of 
CGT reform from a perspective of a typical investment strategy. From the 2013 SIH, we observe 
that a typical rental investor is male, aged 50 and employed full-time. He owns a rental property 
that is valued on average $350,000 and his gross annual income is $85,000 per year, which 
attracts an MITR of 37 per cent. We therefore analyse the implications of reducing the CGT 
discount on the net income of this typical investor.8  
We simulate a transitional measure reflecting a gradual tightening of the CGT discount, from the 
actual discount rate of 50 per cent, to 40 per cent, 30 per cent, 20 per cent, 10 per cent and 
0 per cent (complete abolition of the discount). This is modelled over a range of capital gains 
scenarios at 10 per cent increments, reflecting capital gains that would eventuate under slow to 
high-growth market conditions. Because the average rental property is valued at $350,000, a 
                                               
 
8 We assume the typical investor is single with no children. This controls for the impact of a partner’s 
characteristics on after-tax income. 
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10 per cent capital gain would amount to $35,000, the next 10 per cent increment would result 
in a 20 per cent capital gain of $70,000, and so on.  
Table 12 below reports the impact of CGT reform across a range of discount and capital gains 
scenarios. The table displays some clear trends. Under current settings, a typical rental investor 
with a gross annual income of $85,000 will receive $92,591 upon sale of his rental property if 
capital gains are 10 per cent. The higher the capital gains rate, the greater net income will be 
upon sale of the property. So if capital gains are 20 per cent (50%), the sale of the rental 
property would increase net income to $120,853 ($205,641) for the same investor. 
Holding capital gains constant, a reduction in CGT discount rate from 50 per cent to 0 per cent 
will result in increasingly greater reductions in after-tax or net income. For instance, consider a 
30 per cent capital gains scenario. Under current settings, a typical rental investor with gross 
annual income of $85,000 will receive $149,116 upon sale of his rental property. If the discount 
rate were reduced to 40 per cent, the investor’s net income will decline by $4,043 (or 2.7%). If 
CGT discount were completely abolished, the investor would suffer a reduction in net income of 
$21,013 (or 14.1%). Hence, the greater the reduction in CGT discount rate and the higher the 
capital gains upon sale, the greater the reduction in net income for investors. 
Table 12: Impact of a reduction in CGT discount on the net income of a typical rental 
investor with gross annual income of $85,000, 2013 
Capital gains in 
$ 
CGT discount 
[% in brackets] Actual: Net 
income on sale 
Reforms: Reduction in net income compared to actual 
scenario 
 
50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% 
$35,000 [10%] $92,591 -$1,348 
(-1.5%) 
-$2,695 
(-2.9%) 
-$4,042 
(-4.4%) 
-$5,390 
(-5.8%) 
-$6,738 
(-7.3%) 
$70,000 [20%] $120,853 -$2,695 
(-2.2%) 
-$5,390 
(-4.5%) 
-$8,085 
(-6.7%) 
-$10,780 
(-8.9%) 
-$13,475 
(-11.2%) 
$105,000 [30%] $149,116 -$4,043 
(-2.7%) 
-$8,085 
(-5.4%) 
-$12,128 
(-8.1%) 
-$16,170 
(-10.8%) 
-$21,013 
(-14.1%) 
$140,000 [40%] $177,378 -$5,390 
(-3.0%) 
-$11,020 
(-6.2%) 
-$17,530 
(-9.9%) 
-$24,040 
(-13.6%) 
-$30,550 
(-17.2%) 
$175,000 [50%] $205,641 -$7,538 
(-3.7%) 
-$15,675 
(-7.6%) 
-$23,813 
(-11.6%) 
-$31,950 
(-15.5%) 
-$40,088 
(-19.5%) 
Note: A typical rental investor is a male, aged 50 years, employed full-time, who owns a rental property valued at 
$350,000 and earns a gross annual income of $85,000. 
Source: Authors’ own calculations from EVITA, 2013 SIH. 
Next, we repeat the simulation for a typical rental investor who possesses all the characteristics 
described previously. However, we vary his income in this instance so it is double the amount 
earned by a typical investor. Since the CGT discount is applied at the highest MITR of the rental 
investor, the doubling of income propels the investor from an MITR of 37 per cent to 45 per 
cent. Table 13 below displays the same patterns across CGT discount rates and capital gains 
rates. The greater the reduction in CGT discount rate and the higher the capital gains upon 
sale, the greater the reduction in net income for investors.  
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Table 13: Impact of a reduction in CGT discount on the net income of a typical rental 
investor with gross annual income of $190,000, 2013 
Capital gains in 
$ 
CGT discount 
[% in brackets] Actual: Net 
income on sale 
Reforms: Reduction in net income compared to actual 
scenario 
 
50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% 
$35,000  
[10%] $154,966 
-$1,628 
(-1.1%) 
-$3,255 
(-2.1%) 
-$4,883 
(-3.2%) 
-$6,510 
(-4.2%) 
-$8,138 
(-5.3%) 
$70,000  
[20%] $181,828 
-$3,255 
(-1.8%) 
-$6,510 
(-3.6%) 
-$9,765 
(-5.4%) 
-$13,020 
(-7.2%) 
-$16,275 
(-9.0%) 
$105,000  
[30%] $208,691 
-$4,883 
(-2.3%) 
-$9,765 
(-4.7%) 
-$14,648 
(-7.0%) 
-$19,530 
(-9.4%) 
-$24,413 
(-11.7%) 
$140,000  
[40%] $235,553 
-$6,510 
(-2.8%) 
-$13,020 
(-5.5%) 
-$19,530 
(-8.3%) 
-$26,040 
(-11.1%) 
-$32,550 
(-13.8%) 
$175,000  
[50%] $262,416 
-$8,138 
(-3.1%) 
-$16,275 
(-6.2%) 
-$24,413 
(-9.3%) 
-$32,550 
(-12.4%) 
-$40,688 
(-15.5%) 
Source: Authors’ own calculations from EVITA, 2013 SIH. 
Figure 7 below highlights differences in impact that each CGT discount rate has on investors on 
two different levels of incomes. The figure holds the capital gains constant at $70,000 and 
compares the impact on net income that is felt by a typical investor with $85,000 and $190,000 
gross income. It is clear that a high-income investor will experience a greater dollar reduction in 
net income at each reformed CGT discount rate. However, in proportionate terms, the high-
income investor experiences a smaller percentage reduction in net income (see Figure 8 
below). Because of this discrepancy between percentage and dollar value impacts, any CGT 
policy reform proposals would need to be carefully communicated to avoid a misconception that 
the impact of the CGT reform is likely to be regressive in terms of its proportionate impact on 
rental investors’ net incomes. 
 
AHURI Final Report No. 295 50 
Figure 7: Impact of a reduction in CGT discount on the net income of a typical rental 
investor with gross annual income of $85,000 and $190,000, assuming capital gains of 
$70,000, 2013, dollar reduction 
Source: Authors’ own calculations from EVITA, 2013 SIH. 
Figure 8: Impact of a reduction in CGT discount on the net income of a typical rental 
investor with gross annual income of $85,000 and $190,000, assuming capital gains of 
$70,000, 2013, percentage reduction 
Source: Authors’ own calculations from EVITA, 2013 SIH. 
4.3.2 Impacts on the after-tax economic cost of supplying rental housing 
As noted in the previous subsection, it is not possible to observe the sale of properties by rental 
investors that would in turn attract a CGT discount in the SIH. In this subsection we apply an 
alternative approach to analysing the impacts of CGT reforms on the economic outcomes of 
rental investors using AHURI-3M operationalised on the HILDA Survey. Because the sale of a 
property that attracts a CGT is a one-off transaction rather than a recurrent transaction, an 
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alternative approach of measuring the impact of CGT (and CGT reforms) on rental investors’ 
economic outcomes is to amortise capital gains tax liabilities across the investor’s holding 
period (Wood and Ong 2010, 2013; Wood, Ong et al. 2011).  
AHURI-3M contains a rental investors' module operationalised on three of HILDA’s wealth 
modules—in 2002, 2006 and 2010—that specifically measures the after-tax economic cost of 
supplying rental housing borne by rental investors, also commonly known as the user cost of 
capital. It is usually measured per dollar of capital value. The key components of the user cost 
typically comprise recurrent and capital components, with the latter amortised over a holding 
period of 10 years. The recurrent components include annual financing costs,9 annual operating 
costs10 and annual capital gains, while the amortised capital components include the amortised 
value of CGT liability and transaction costs. Details on measurement of the key components of 
the user cost are laid out in Wood and Ong (2008).  
Table 14 below reports the after-tax economic cost born by landlords per dollar of the capital 
value of their rental property, for the years 2002, 2006 and 2010. On average, after-tax 
economic costs have been reasonably consistent across years, rising slightly from 6.7 per cent 
under actual CGT parameters to 7.3 per cent in 2006 and remaining more or less constant at 
7.4 per cent in 2010. Taking an average residential rental investment property value of 
$350,000, a user cost of 7.4 per cent in 2010 would amount to around $25,900 in after-tax 
economic costs per year.  
As in the previous subsection, the table documents the results of an investigation of a gradual 
reduction in CGT discount rate by ten percentage points to 0 per cent, which represents a 
complete abolition of the CGT discount. As the CGT discount is gradually reduced, this would 
increase landlords’ after-tax economic cost of holding rental property in each year. Taking the 
year 2010, a complete abolition in CGT discount would increase rental investors’ after-tax 
economic costs from 7.4 per cent to 8 per cent. However, a gradual reduction in the discount 
would ‘soften’ the impact of the CGT reform by providing a transition pathway that raises the 
after-tax economic cost of holding rental investment housing by 0.1 percentage point for every 
10 percentage point reduction in the CGT discount rate. Assuming a rental investment property 
value of $350,000, a 0.1 percentage point increase in user cost amounts to $350 per year. The 
results support a case for a transitional approach in CGT reform, although it is worth noting that 
the approach of amortising CGT liabilities, while a convenient and logical approach in the 
absence of necessary data on sales transactions and capital gains, does not reflect the reality 
that the CGT tax is actually a lump sum liability rather than a recurrent annual expenditure.  
                                               
 
9 The financing costs include after-tax interest on mortgage debt and the after-tax return sacrificed on the rental 
investor’s equity stake in the property. 
10 Operating costs include maintenance costs, property taxes and land taxes. 
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Table 14: Impact of a reduction in CGT discount on the average user cost rental 
investors, per cent of property value, 2002, 2006 and 2010 
Year User cost under CGT discount scenarios % point 
difference 
between 0% 
discount and 
50% discount 
 Actual Reforms 
 
50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% 
2002 6.7% 6.9% 7.1% 7.2% 7.4% 7.6% 0.9% 
2006 7.3% 7.5% 7.6% 7.7% 7.9% 8.0% 0.7% 
2010 7.4% 7.5% 7.6% 7.8% 7.9% 8.0% 0.7% 
Source: Authors’ own calculations from AHURI-3M, 2002, 2006 and 2010 HILDA Survey. 
In Table 15 below, we examine for the year 2010 the impact of different rates of capital gains. 
The AHURI-3M microsimulation model uses a baseline housing price appreciation rate of 
3.5 per cent. We adopt this is a medium growth scenario, and compare it with a low growth 
scenario represented by an appreciation rate of 2.5 per cent and a high growth scenario 
represented by 4.5 per cent. Housing market conditions are clearly important; under the actual 
scenario, rental investors’ after-tax economic costs of supplying rental housing rises falls from 
8.8 per cent under a low growth scenario to 6 per cent under a high growth scenario. This is 
unsurprising as a higher capital appreciation rate will increase annual capital gains that are only 
partially offset by a discounted CGT liability. 
Table 15: Impact of a reduction in CGT discount on the average user cost rental investors 
under different capital gains scenarios, per cent of property value, 2010 
 
House price 
appreciation 
rate 
User cost under CGT discount scenarios 
 Actual Reforms 
 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% 
Mean user cost 
(%) 
2.50% 8.8% 8.9% 8.9% 9.0% 9.1% 9.2% 
3.50% 7.4% 7.5% 7.6% 7.8% 7.9% 8.0% 
4.50% 6.0% 6.2% 6.4% 6.6% 6.7% 6.9% 
% point diff. in 
user cost 
between reform 
and actual 
2.50%   0.1% 0.2% 0.3% 0.3% 0.4% 
3.50%   0.2% 0.3% 0.4% 0.5% 0.7% 
4.50%   0.2% 0.4% 0.5% 0.7% 0.9% 
Source: Authors’ own calculations from AHURI-3M, 2010 HILDA Survey. 
Table 16 below sets out the predicted distributional impacts of the CGT reform across different 
income groups in 2010. Rental investors are classified according to their MITR bracket, with the 
lowest incomes reflected in the 0 per cent MITR bracket and investors on the highest incomes 
captured in the 45 per cent bracket. First, it can be noted that under the actual CGT scenario, 
the user cost declines as one progresses up the MITR bracket. This reflects the fact that 
landlords’ tax savings from negative gearing and the CGT discount increase as their MITRs rise. 
Hence, the after tax-economic cost of holding property tends to be lower for rental investors on 
higher MITR brackets.  
As noted in Chapter 1, the asymmetric tax treatment of rental income and capital gains favour 
high tax bracket investors at the expense of low tax bracket investors. These market 
imperfections create rent clientele effects, whereby rental submarkets with high expected capital 
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appreciation rates will attract high tax bracket investors because they pay lower taxes on capital 
gains than if they receive an equivalent sum in rental income. In contrast, in rental submarkets 
with low expected capital gains, high tax bracket investor demand will be weak, so property 
prices will fall. Low tax bracket investors will only invest in relatively low value rental housing 
that attracts rents that are high in relation to property values. This pushes up rents relative to 
property values in low value segments of the rental market, making rental housing more 
expensive and therefore less affordable in precisely those segments where lower income 
households typically seek housing (Wood and Tu 2004; Wood, Stewart et al. 2010). 
A progressive reduction in the CGT discount rate will impact on rental investors on higher 
incomes to a greater degree than investors on lower incomes. So, for instance, as shown in 
Table 16 below, among those in the 0.1–5 per cent MITR track, a reduction in CGT discount 
rate from 50 per cent to 0 per cent would raise their average user cost of capital from 
7.3 per cent to 8.1 per cent, a rise of 0.8 percentage points. However, among investors in the 
highest MITR tax bracket, average user cost of capital would rise by 1.2 per cent—from 
7.4 per cent to 8.6 per cent. The results indicate that a reduction in CGT discount will narrow the 
gap in user cost burdens that lower income and higher income rental investors have to bear. 
Table 16: Impact of a reduction in CGT discount on the average user cost rental 
investors, by pre-reform income unit MITR bracket, per cent of property value, 2010 
 Pre-reform 
income unit 
MITR 
bracket 
User cost under CGT discount scenarios 
 Actual Reforms 
 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% 
Mean user cost 
(%) 
0% 7.6% 7.6% 7.6% 7.6% 7.6% 7.6% 
0.1– 5% 7.3% 7.4% 7.5% 7.5% 7.6% 7.6% 
15.1-30% 7.4% 7.6% 7.7% 7.8% 7.9% 8.0% 
30.1-37% 7.3% 7.5% 7.7% 7.8% 8.0% 8.1% 
37.1-45% 7.4% 7.6% 7.8% 8.1% 8.3% 8.6% 
Total 7.4% 7.5% 7.6% 7.8% 7.9% 8.0% 
% point diff. in 
user cost 
between reform 
and actual 
0%   0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
0.1–15%   0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 0.2% 0.3% 
15.1–30%   0.1% 0.3% 0.4% 0.5% 0.6% 
30.1–37%   0.2% 0.3% 0.5% 0.7% 0.8% 
37.1–45%   0.2% 0.5% 0.7% 0.9% 1.2% 
Total   0.2% 0.3% 0.4% 0.5% 0.7% 
Source: Authors’ own calculations from AHURI-3M, 2010 HILDA Survey. 
4.4 Policy development implications  
4.4.1 Negative gearing 
Overall, the two negative gearing reforms that will result in the greatest amount of budgetary 
savings are a rental deduction cap of $5,000 and progressive rental deductions on an income 
based criteria—both cost $1.3 billion each, resulting in savings of over $1.7 billion each. Both 
are progressive in nature, reducing tax savings from negative gearing by greater margins as tax 
assessable income increases.  
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If the policy concern is that a tightening of negative gearing parameters will impact on ‘mum and 
dad’ investors’ economic wellbeing negatively and result in a behavioural decision by such 
investors to withdraw from the rental housing market, then it is likely that a progressive rental 
deduction that cushions ‘mum and dad’ investors from significant drops in tax savings will be a 
more appropriate policy option than a more blunt $5,000 cap on rental deductions. The potential 
for significant housing supply contraction in the rental market may therefore be lower under a 
progressive rental deduction, holding all other factors constant.  
Moreover, an income (property value) based deduction has the potential to reduce inequities 
inherent within the current systems by reducing tax savings by proportionately greater amounts 
for those who have relatively high income (property asset) levels than rental deduction caps. 
However, it is noteworthy that progressive rental deduction reforms will likely be administratively 
more complex to implement than a cap. A more practical approach may be to differentiate 
between ‘mum and dad’ investors and ‘sophisticated’ investors by income or property value 
bands rather than percentile ranges.  
Regardless of the income measure used to differentiate between the two types of investors, it is 
noteworthy that the progressive nature of the reform may blunt incentives to work by investors 
looking to reduce their incomes so they fall into a band or percentile that allows them to be 
classified as ‘mum and dad’ investors. 
4.4.2 Capital gains tax discount 
The greater the reduction in CGT discount rate and the higher the capital gains upon sale, the 
greater the reduction in net income for investors. Holding other factors constant, a higher 
income investor will also experience a greater dollar reduction in net income at each reformed 
CGT discount rate than a lower income investor with the same capital gains rate. However, in 
proportionate terms, the high-income investor experiences a smaller percentage reduction in 
net income. Because of this discrepancy between percentage and dollar value impacts, any 
CGT policy reform proposals would need to be carefully communicated to avoid a 
misconception that the impact of the CGT reform is likely to be regressive in terms of its 
proportionate impact on rental investors’ net incomes. 
A reduction in the CGT discount rate will impact on rental investors on higher incomes to a 
greater degree than investors on lower incomes. This will narrow the gap in user cost burdens 
that lower income and higher income rental investors have to bear, reducing inequities within 
the current system.  
A gradual reduction in the discount would ‘soften’ the impact of the CGT reform by providing a 
transition pathway that raises the after-tax economic cost of holding rental investment housing 
by 0.1 percentage point for every 10 percentage point reduction in the CGT discount rate. 
Assuming a rental investment property value of $350,000, a 0.1 percentage point increase in 
user cost amounts to $350 per year. The results support a case for a transitional approach in 
CGT reform. However, it is worth noting the pros and cons of adopting an approach of 
amortising CGT liabilities. While it represents a convenient and logical approach in the absence 
of necessary data on sales transactions and capital gains, it does not reflect the reality that the 
CGT is actually a lump sum liability rather than a recurrent expenditure. 
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5 Policy development options  
This report has developed and modelled pathways to reform the income tax treatment of 
housing assets. It focuses on key tax arrangements that have featured prominently in national 
policy debates as having the potential to exacerbate distortions in property markets, including 
negative gearing arrangements and CGT provisions.  
The existing literature has highlighted concerns around the potentially distortionary effects of the 
present Federal income tax treatment of housing assets on housing market stability and 
housing affordability. Personal income tax concessions distort investment decisions, with 
adverse implications for the distribution of housing assets and outcomes in the housing market. 
First, the presence of debt financed housing investors on a large scale is a potential source of 
instability in the housing market. Second, it would appear that property investors are 
increasingly crowding out first home buyers from the property market. Third, the asymmetric tax 
treatment of rental income and capital gains favour high tax bracket investors at the expense of 
low tax bracket investors. Fourth, the main residence exemption, under which a primary 
residence is exempt from capital gains tax, can reduce mobility of labour supply. In short, 
personal income tax concessions distort investment decisions, with adverse implications for the 
distribution of housing assets and outcomes in the housing market. Despite periodic national 
reviews of the tax system such as the 2010 Australia’s Future Tax System (‘Henry’ Review), 
meaningful action aimed at implementing reform to the negative gearing and CGT provisions 
continue to be fraught with political obstacles to change. These policy concerns form the 
primary motivators behind this report.  
5.1 Key findings and links to policy development 
5.1.1 How do existing elements of the Federal income tax system (in particular 
the availability of deductions and CGT provisions) potentially impact on 
housing ownership and affordability? 
The Australian tax system is asymmetrical in respect of both owner-occupied and own-to-invest 
properties. Owner-occupied properties are exempt from many taxes, including capital gains tax. 
There is no imputed rent applied to claw back the exemption. In respect of own-to-invest 
properties, the report’s policy audit has shown that the income tax treatment of investment 
property provides an annual tax deduction to the owners of negatively-geared property that 
subsidises the holding cost of property. This deduction is made up of a combination of cash 
outgoings, of which the most significant is loan interest, and capital allowances which are non-
cash expenses. In contrast, when the property is sold the gain is included on the capital 
account. The amount is included on realisation and is subject to a discount of 50 per cent when 
derived by an individual or a trustee, or 33 per cent when derived by a superannuation fund. 
Hence, the policy audit identified two key sources of asymmetric treatment in rental income and 
capital gains in the housing market. First, there exists a mismatch in the timing of the deduction 
and the capital gain with the deductions predating the capital gain. Second, the amount of the 
rental deduction is not discounted whereas the capital gain is discounted. This combination of 
factors provides an incentive for the owners of investment properties to borrow a larger 
proportion of the acquisition price as the interest deduction is allowed in full whereas only 
50 per cent of the capital gain is included. A leveraged investment will result in a higher capital 
gain where the growth in property prices exceeds the interest rate. 
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5.1.2 Which investor groups, household types and housing market segments 
benefit or are disadvantaged by current negative gearing and CGT 
provisions?  
Negatively-geared investors who receive the highest tax savings are typically middle-aged full-
time employed males. On the other hand, the ones who benefit the least are females and older 
investors aged 55+ years who are not in the labour force. Home-owner investors who own both 
a family home and at least one rental investment property received the greatest CGT discount 
benefits while renters who do not own properties do not receive any CGT discount. CGT 
discount benefits are heavily weighted towards those who are more affluent in terms of both 
income and property wealth. On average, a home-owner investor can own a property portfolio 
worth over $730,000. Home-owner investors’ average tax assessable income is $82,000 
compared to $31,000 among renters who do not own any properties.  
A key policy consideration is that negative gearing and CGT discount benefits are heavily 
skewed towards those who are more affluent, raising issues around the extent to which such 
policies exacerbate income and wealth inequality among the Australian population. Negatively-
geared rental investors making a loss of around $8,800 on average while positively-geared 
investors make a profit of around $16,000 on average. However, negatively-geared investors 
have noticeably higher tax assessable incomes than positively-geared investors. The former 
reported an average tax assessable income of $91,000 in the 2013–14 SIH compared to 
$78,500 among positively-geared investors. Among negatively-geared investors, those who 
receive the greatest tax savings are also those who have the highest incomes and rental 
property values, and greatest annual net rental losses. Similarly, CGT discount benefits are 
heavily weighted towards those who are more affluent in terms of both income and property 
wealth. On average, a home-owner investor can own a property portfolio worth over $730,000. 
Home-owner investors’ average tax assessable income is $82,000 compared to $31,000 among 
renters who do not own any properties. Hence, any reforms to negative gearing or CGT ought 
to ensure that it reduces inequities inherent within the current systems by reducing tax savings 
by proportionately greater amounts for those who have relatively high income or asset levels. 
A second but tentative policy implication derives from the longitudinal analysis of rental 
investment spells in the HILDA Survey. It would appear that negatively-geared investors may be 
more likely to terminate rental leases as market conditions change. Negatively-geared investors 
make operating losses and hence their rental investment decisions are more sensitive to 
changes in economic conditions than positively-geared investors, so this finding is not 
surprising. However, the policy implications are mixed. On the one hand, this may have adverse 
impacts on the tenure security of tenants and indeed overall housing market stability. On the 
other hand, as suggested by Wood and Ong (2010), there are potential efficiency gains from 
landlords having the flexibility to adjust supply in the rental market in response to changes in 
housing market conditions.  
5.1.3 What are the revenue and distributional impacts of different negative 
gearing reform scenarios and transitional arrangements on housing 
investors and the Federal budget?  
A complete abolition of negative gearing reforms has often been criticised by policy-makers for 
its potentially adverse impacts on the financial wellbeing of ‘mum and dad’ investors. Hence, in 
our first set of simulations, we distinguish between ‘mum and dad’ and ‘sophisticated’ investor 
and apply more generous concessions to the former. We differentiate between these investors 
groups in two ways—by applying income and property-based criteria.  
Under the proposed reforms, ‘mum and dad’ investors in the bottom half of the income and 
property value distributions are excluded from any reduction in rental deductions and therefore 
experience no reduction in tax savings. At the other extreme, those in the upper quartile are 
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subject to a full quarantine of negative gearing and therefore receive zero rental deductions, 
resulting in a complete loss of their tax savings from negative gearing. Those in the 50th to 75th 
percentiles receive a 50 per cent rental deduction, a less severe measure than zero rental 
deductions. ‘Mum and dad’ investors in this group lose around half of their rental deductions. 
They are therefore cushioned from a complete loss of their rental deductions, and less likely to 
make a behavioural decision to exit the rental market than if they were subject to a full 
quarantining of negative gearing. Such a measure is therefore also a potential transitional 
arrangement that could ease the pathway towards a complete negative gearing quarantine for 
all rental investors over time.  
If a rental deduction cap is applied across all income levels, the average tax savings that 
negative-geared rental investors receive reduces only very slightly by $25 under a generous 
$40,000 cap to a $921 decline if the cap is further reduced to $5,000. Reducing the cap levels 
will result in increasingly lower levels of rental deductions across the income distribution.  
Overall, the two reforms that will result in the greatest amount of budgetary savings are a rental 
deduction cap of $5,000 and progressive rental deductions on an income-based criteria—both 
cost $1.3 billion each, resulting in savings of over $1.7 billion each. Both are progressive in 
nature, reducing tax savings from negative gearing by greater margins as tax assessable 
income increases.  
If the policy concern is that a tightening of negative gearing parameters will impact on ‘mum and 
dad’ investors’ economic wellbeing negatively and result in a behavioural decision by such 
investors to withdraw from the rental housing market, then it is likely that a progressive rental 
deduction that cushions ‘mum and dad’ investors from significant drops in tax savings will be a 
more appropriate policy option than a more blunt $5,000 cap on rental deductions. The potential 
for significant housing supply contraction in the rental market may therefore be lower under a 
progressive rental deduction, holding all other factors constant.  
Moreover, an income (property value) based deduction has the potential to reduce inequities 
inherent with the current systems by reducing tax savings by proportionately greater amounts 
for those who have relatively high income (property asset) levels than rental deduction caps. 
However, it is noteworthy that progressive rental deduction reforms will likely be administratively 
more complex to implement than a cap. A more practical approach may be to differentiate 
between ‘mum and dad’ investors and ‘sophisticated’ investors by income or property value 
bands rather than percentile ranges. 
Regardless of the income measure used to differentiate between the two types of investors, it is 
noteworthy that the progressive nature of the reform may blunt incentives to work by investors 
looking to reduce their incomes so they fall into a band or percentile that allows them to be 
classified as ‘mum and dad’ investors. 
5.1.4 What are the revenue and distributional impacts of different CGT reform 
scenarios and transitional arrangements on housing investors and the Federal 
budget?  
It is possible to estimate the impact of a reduction in CGT discount rate on rental investors’ 
economic outcomes in two alternative ways. The first approach is to estimate the impact of the 
CGT reform on rental investors’ after-tax or net incomes at the point of sale. The second is to 
estimate the impact of the reform on a rental investor’s after-tax economic costs of holding 
rental property (per dollar of the capital value of their rental property) by amortising the 
investor’s CGT liability across the investor’s property holding period. 
In terms of net income impacts, a reduction in the CGT discount rate would reduce the net 
incomes of rental investors. However, the extent of this reduction will depend on interactions 
across various factors, including the discount rate reduction, the investor’s income and the 
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investor’s capital gains on the rental property at the time of sale. The greater the reduction in 
the CGT discount rate and the higher the capital gains upon sale, the greater the reduction in 
net income for investors. Holding other factors constant, a higher income investor will also 
experience a greater dollar reduction in net income at each reformed CGT discount rate than a 
lower income investor with the same capital gains rate. However, in proportionate terms, the 
high-income investor experiences a smaller percentage reduction in net income. Because of 
this discrepancy between percentage and dollar value impacts, any CGT policy reform 
proposals would need to be carefully communicated to avoid a misconception that the impact of 
the CGT reform is likely to be regressive in terms of its proportionate impact on rental investors’ 
net incomes. 
A reduction in the CGT discount rate will impact on rental investors on higher incomes to a 
greater degree than it will on investors on lower incomes. So, for instance, among those in the 
0.1–15 per cent MITR band in 2010, a reduction in the CGT discount rate from 50 per cent to 
0 per cent would raise their average user cost of capital from 7.3 per cent to 8.1 per cent, a rise 
of 0.8 percentage points. However, among investors in the highest MITR tax bracket, the 
average user cost of capital would rise by 1.2 per cent—from 7.4 per cent to 8.6 per cent. 
Hence, a reduction in CGT discount will narrow the gap in user cost burdens that lower income 
and higher income rental investors have to bear, reducing inequities within the current system.  
A gradual reduction in the discount would ‘soften’ the impact of the CGT reform by providing a 
transition pathway that raises the after-tax economic cost of holding rental investment housing 
by 0.1 percentage point for every 10 percentage point reduction in the CGT discount rate. 
Assuming a rental investment property value of $350,000, a 0.1 percentage point increase in 
user cost amounts to $350 per year. The results support a case for a transitional approach in 
CGT reform, although it is worth noting that the approach of amortising CGT liabilities, while a 
convenient and logical approach in the absence of necessary data on sales transactions and 
capital gains, does not reflect the reality that the CGT tax is actually a lump sum liability rather 
than a recurrent annual expenditure. 
5.2 Novel contributions and future research directions 
This report confirms an existing body of knowledge about the distortionary impacts of negative 
gearing and CGT discount arrangements, and the potential of policy reforms to alleviate these 
distortions, with potential benefits for stability and reduction in inequity in the treatment of 
different lower income subgroups versus higher income subgroups in the housing market. 
However, it also offers new findings that are both novel and which add to the policy evidence 
base.  
First, a sample validation exercise conducted across three nationally representative datasets—
the ABS SIH, the HILDA Survey and the ATO sample file—shows that there is a significant 
underestimation of the number of negatively-geared rental investors and net rental losses in the 
survey data. As part of this report’s analysis, we have undertaken an intricate benchmarking 
exercise to redistribute net rental losses across rental investors in SIH, so that the distribution of 
net rental losses in the SIH are better aligned with the ATO data.  
Second, this report has modelled several potential transitional arrangements that may ease the 
distribution pressures arising from reforms to negative gearing and CGT reform, and help 
smooth a reform pathway that is more politically acceptable. Importantly, a complete abolition of 
negative gearing reforms has often been criticised by policy-makers for its potentially adverse 
impacts on the financial wellbeing of ‘mum and dad’ investors. In a series of simulations, we 
distinguish between ‘mum and dad’ and ‘sophisticated’ investors and apply more generous 
concessions to the former so that they are less likely to make a behavioural decision to exit the 
rental market in response to a negative gearing reform that results in a reduction in rental 
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deductions. Such a measure is therefore also a potential transitional arrangement that could 
ease the pathway towards a complete negative gearing quarantine for all rental investors over 
time. 
However, there remains scope for implementing an analysis that has the potential to further 
increase the evidence base to inform policy-making with regard to the Federal income tax 
treatment of housing assets.  
First, there remains an under-reporting of net rental losses in the HILDA Survey that has not 
been addressed in this report. There is potential for future analysis to mitigate this reporting bias 
via replication of the SIH redistribution exercise across HILDA data.  
Second, there remains scope for designing increasingly sophisticated modelling methodologies 
that would facilitate the modelling of combinations of negative gearing and CGT reform. Such 
modelling strategies would need to address at least two difficulties. One is that negative gearing 
affects a recurrent stream of income to rental investors, while the CGT is a lump sum liability 
that is levied at the point of sale of the property. Another is the fact that it is often not possible to 
observe the capital gain of properties and transactions that would result in the application of the 
CGT discount from survey data such as the SIH and HILDA Surveys. 
Third, there appears to be potential in pursuing a progressive rental deduction reform that 
cushions the financial wellbeing of ‘mum and dad’ investors by applying more generous 
concessions to them than ‘sophisticated’ investors. While this report has presented results from 
two reforms based on income and property value criteria, there appears scope for 
experimenting with alternative criteria for differentiating between ‘mum and dad’ and 
‘sophisticated’ investors.  
Finally, the distributional analysis presented in this report has largely relied on individual income 
so there is scope to expand the analysis based on a household basis to take into account intra-
household allocation of property investment assets should such data become available in the 
future.  
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